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THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT OF 1933:
REVISED REGULATION A
By
*

SANFORD
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HERTZ*
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private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon the
staff of the Commission.

Sanford B. Hertz: Born Wilkes
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Michigan; senior editor Michigan
Law Review; Order of the COIF;
legislative analyst for Legislative
Research Center, Univ. of Michigan; attorney for U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission; member Michigan and Colorado Bar
Associations; author "Non-Conforming Uses: Problems and Methods of Elimination," Dicta, Vol. 33,
No. 2.

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Section 3 (b) under the Securities Act of 1933, as
currently amended,' the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to add any class of securities to the securities already exempted from the registration requirements of this Act, if the Commission finds that registration is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering. 2 From this
broad power the Commission has promulgated an exemption from
the registration provisions by enacting Regulation A and therefore
in effect finding that the registration of such securities prior to
public sale "is not necessary in the public interest." Briefly, Regulation A provides an exemption from the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act for the sale of certain securities by an issuer not exceeding $300,000 in any one year. A filing of a letter of notification
together with an offering circular and the use of such offering cir1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b). This section states that: "The Commission may from time to time by its
rules and regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any
class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for
the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $300,000." (Emphasis supplied.)
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a) (1-11). For an article discussing the "private offering" exemption,
see, Mehler, "The Securities Act of 1933: 'Private' or 'Public' Offering." 32 DICTA 359 (1955).
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cular in the public sale of the securities is a condition precedent to
obtaining the exemption.
Recently the Commission revised Regulation A in accordance
with what it felt reflected the needs of the industry and to provide
for greater protection to the investing public without the necessity
of filing a registration statement as required by the 1933 Act. 4 Again
by the enactment of this new Regulation A, the Commission was in
effect finding that the registration of such securities was not necessary in the public interest and that an exemption from such requirements did adequately protect the investing public.
The purpose of this article will be to discuss and analyze this revised Regulation A with a view to pointing up the substantial
changes from the previous regulation and to discuss briefly the
application of this regulation. It should also be noted in passing that
no attempt will be made to discuss fully all of the terms and conditions of Regulation A, but emphasis will be on only the changes
promulgated by its recent revision.- Of course, an inherent defect
in such an analysis at this early stage is that all of our discussions
and views will be conjectural since it is impossible at this point to
determine how the Commission or a court of law will interpret this
new regulation. With this difficulty in mind, we shall immediately
proceed to our study of this revised regulation.
AVAILABLILITY OF THE REGULATION
The new Regulation, as did the prior one, denies the availability
of the exemption for the securities of any issuer if such issuer, any
of its predecessors 6 or any affiliated issuer' has filed a registration
statement which is the subject of any proceeding or examination
under Section 8 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,8 or is the
subject of any refusal order or stop order entered into by virtue of
this section within five years prior to the filing required by Regulation A; is subject to any proceedings under Rule 261 of Regulation
A' entered within five years prior to the filing; has been convicted
within five years prior to the filing of any crime or offense involving
the purchase or sale of securities; is subject to any order, judgment
or decree of any court entered within five years prior to the filing
temporarily or permanently restraining or enjoining such person
from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; or is subject to a United
States Post Office fraud order.'"
The new revised regulation, however, adds a more stringent
qualification to the availability of the exemption by providing that
no exemption will be available under Regulation A if any of the is:t. For a general discussion of this exemption, see, LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION, 380 (1951).
4. See Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3663.
5. For an article on Regulation A before the recent revision, see, Krakover & Mehler, "Some
Aspects of The Securities Regulation Law: Regulation 'A' and its Revision," 32 DICTA 71 (1955).
6. Predecessor is defined in the revised regulation in Rule 251 as "...(i)
a person the major rr
t;on of whose

assets have

been acquired directly or indirectly by the issuer,

or (i;)

a person

rom

which the issuer acquired directly or indirectly the major portion of its assets."
7. Affiliate is defined in the revised regulation in Rule 251 as ". . . a person controlling, contraled by, or under common control with such issuer. An individual who controls on issuer is also
an affiliate of such issuer."
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77h (Stop order proceeding).
9. Said Rule 261 provides the various grounds upon which the Commission can suspend the
exemption under
2 5 2 Regulation A. This will be discussed in more detail infra.
10. Rule
(c) (1) (2) (3) (4) of revised Regulation A.

Nov.-Dec., 1956

DICTA

suer's directors, officers or principal security holders, any of its promoters presently connected with it in any capacity, any underwriter
of the securities to be offered, or any partner, director or officer of
any such underwriter has been convicted, within ten years prior to
the filing, of any crime or offense involving the purchase or sale of
any security or arising out of such person's conduct as an underwriter, broker, dealer or investment adviser." The previous regulation authorized only a five-year search of the records to determine
whether any of the aforementioned class of persons had been convicted, while the new regulation authorizes a ten-year search of
such records. Further, the old regulation spoke only in terms of the
principal underwriter of the issuer, while the new regulation states
that any underwriter may be examined to determine if any facts
exist which will prohibit the availability of the exemption to the
issuer. Thus, because of this, the Commission is given broader authority to scrutinize all members of the principal underwriter's selling
group in order to permit the exemption to only those issuers whose
associates have not been tinted with any convictions involving security violations.
The new revised regulation goes still further with respect to its
examination of whether any of the issuer's directors, officers or
principal security holders, any of its promoters, any underwriter or
any partner, director or officer of any such underwriter is subject
to any order, judgment or decree of any court temporarily or permanently enjoining such person from engaging in or continuing any
conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security or arising out of such person's conduct as an underwriter,
broker, dealer or investment adviser, or is subject to an order of the
Commission entered pursuant to Section 15 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 12 or is subject to an order of the Commission
entered pursuant to Section 203 (d) or (e) of the Investment Ad11. Rule 252(d) (1) of revised Regulation A.
12. 15 U.S.C.A. § 780(b). This section in essence and in part permits the Commission to deny
or revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds that such broker or dealer filed any
willfully false statements with the Commission and that it is in the public interest to so revoke; or has
been convicted within ten years preceding the filing of any felony or misdemeanor involving security
transactions; or is permanently or temporarily enjoined from engaging in or continuing any conduct
or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; or has willfully violated any of
the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.

See2-N0ldtlahr
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visers Act of 1940;'1' has been and is suspended or expelled from
membership in a national or provincial securities dealers association
or a national securities exchange or a Canadian securities exchange;
or is subject to a United States Post Office fraud order.5 4 The Commission not only eliminated the five-year limitation of the prior
regulation but it set no time limitation with respect to a search of
the record to ascertain whether any or all of the above persons were
subject to any or all of the above disabilities. Thus, for example, if
any of the above persons are presently subject to an injunction
entered by a court at any time, the exemption would not be available.
The revised regulation again goes one step further than the old
one in denying the availability of the exemption for the securities
of any issuer if any underwriter of such securities, or any director,
officer or partner of any such underwriter was or was named as an
underwriter of any securities covered by any registration statement
which is the subject of any proceeding or examination under Section
8 of the 1933 Act 15 or is the subject of any refusal order or stop order
entered thereunder within five years prior to the filing for the
Regulation A exemption; or covered by any filing subject to any
proceeding under the Commission's powers and authorities to
suspend the Regulation A exemption."' This is an additional conditional requirement to the availability of the Regulation A exemption which was absent in the prior regulation.
All of the foregoing conditions may in effect be waived and
inapplicable if the Commission determines that it is not necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors that the exemption be denied because of the failure to meet
these conditions. 1 7 Thus is left open a broad power to mitigate
under circumstances which do not necessitate a strict compliance
with these conditions.
The new regulation also consolidates Regulation D with Regulation A, the former applicable to only security offerings of Canadian companies. Now companies of both the United States and
Canada can utilize the exemption provided by Regulation A if, in
fact, such offerings meet all of the other terms and conditions of
the Regulation A exemption.'
This consolidation should bring
about a consistent administrative policy applicable to both Canadian and United States companies and make administration of the
regulation a more efficient process.
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN OFFERINGS
Perhaps the most significant change found in the new regulation is the special requirements which apply to offerings made by
an issuer when such issuer was (1) incorporated or organized
13. 15 U.S.C.A, § 80b(d) (e). This section in essence and in part permits the Commission after appropriate hearing to deny or revoke the registration of any applicant under the Investment Company Act.
14. Revised Regulation A, Rule 252(d) (1) (2) (3) (4).
15. See note 8 supro.
1G. Revised Regulation A, Rule 252(e) (1) (2).
17. Revised Regulation A, Rule 252(f).
18. Revised Regulation A, Rule 252.
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within one year prior to the date of filing for the Regulation A
exemption and has not had a net income from operations within
that year; or when (2) such issuer was incorporated or organized
more than one year prior to the date of such filing and has not had
a net income from operations, of the character in which the issuer
intends to engage, for at least one of the last two fiscal years.'9 The
italicized portion would indicate that a business association, for
example, which has had net income from its manufacturing operations would still be subject to this rule if it intended to engage in
a mining venture and did not have net income from such venture.
Thus, if any of the foregoing conditions are present, the special
requirements of Rule 253 of revised Regulation A must be met
before the exemption would be available. We now turn to a
specific examination of these requirements.
One provision which did not appear in the prior regulation
states in essence that if the issuer conducts its principal business
operations in Canada, the securities must be qualified or made
eligible for public sale under the laws of Canada and specifically20
in the Province in which such operations are to be conducted.
Thus, if an issuer was subject to this rule and was for any reason
unable to qualify its securities for sale in such Province, the exemption provided by Regulation A would not be available.
Rule 254 of revised Regulation A adopts the same language
19. Revised Regulation A, Rule 253(a) (1) (2).
20. Revised Regulation A, Rule 253(b).
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as did Rule 217 under the prior regulation with respect to the
monetary limitation of $300,000 to be offered by an issuer, its predecessors and all of its affiliates within one year prior to the commencement of the proposed offering. However, when the securities to be offered are within the scope of those which must comply
with the special requirements of Rule 253, in computing the
amount of the securities which may be offered there must be included, in addition to the securities specified in Rule 254, all securities issued prior to the filing or proposed to be issued subsequent
to the filing for a consideration consisting in whole or in part of
assets or services and held by the person to whom issued, and all
securities issued to and held by or proposed to be issued, pursuant
to options or otherwise, to any director, officer or promoter of
the issuer, or to any underwriter, dealer or security salesman connected with the issuer.2 1 Thus, if options are granted to the underwriter of the issuer, the underlying shares which might be obtained by the exercise of the option must be included within the
$300,000 computation and must be qualified under the filing for
the Regulation A exemption. For example, if an issuer purported
to offer $300,000 in securities and did not cover such shares subject
to option rights in the letter of notification, it would appear that
the monetary amount of $300,000 would be exceeded and that,
therefore, the terms and conditions of the exemption would not
be met and thus the exemption would not be available for the
securities which might be publicly sold.
However, a proviso to this requirement permits that these
additional securities or options need not be included within the
$300,000 monetary limitation imposed by Regulation A if provision is made, by escrow arrangements or otherwise, to assure that
none of such securities or any interest therein will be reoffered to
the public within one year after the commencement of the offering
and that any such reoffering will be made in accordance with the
provisions of the 1933 Act.2 It would appear that the most satisfactory method of meeting this requirement would be to provide
for an' escrow arrangement wherein the securities would be held
for the prescribed period of time by an independent agent. In such
event, a statement should be included in the escrow agreement
itself and the offering circular that there will be no assignment
or other disposition of
any interest in the escrowed shares during
22
the prescribed period.. 3

In addition to the foregoing requirements, any securities which
are subject to this rule may not be offered for the account of any
253

21. Revised Regulation A, Rule
(c) (1) (2).
22. Revised Regulation A, Rule 253(c).
23. Under the prior regulation it had been
options or warrants

the administrative practice of requiring that any

issued by any company filing for the exemption be made

the options and the underlying shores thereof be made non-assignable,

non-exercisable, and

non-s-lab!o, and nan-t-ans-

feroble for a period of not less than one year from the date of the commencement of the proposed
offering and until the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 have been met.
In lieu thereof,
the options and underlying shares must be qualified under the filing and thus be counted in calculating the $300,000 amount prescribed by Rule 217 of the prior regulation. Query: Since the
requirement to escrow the securities and the options apply to only those companies falling within
the language of those which must comply with these special requirements, what of the other com-

panies, outside the scope of these requirements? Must they still "lock in" such options, warrants and
underlying shares?
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2 4
Thus, if an
person other than the issuer of such securities.
officer or director of the issuer who acquired stock in his company wished to publicly sell this stock, he must either file a registration statement with the Commission or find some other exemption from the registration provisions. He is thus deprived of the
use of the exemption permitted by Regulation A.
The prior regulation permitted an issuer to file a statement
pursuant to Rule 219(b) with the Commission's Regional Office
in order to avail itself of the Regulation A exemption without
the necessity of filing and using an offering circular, if in fact such
offering did not exceed $50,000 in any one year. Rule 257 of the
new regulation in essence adopts this "short form filing" for
security offerings not in excess of $50,000. However, if the securities of an issuer are subject to the special requirements of Rule 253,
this limited filing for small issues is not available and such a company must2 5file and use the offering circular to avail itself of the

exemption..

One can quickly see from the foregoing discussion that if an
issuer is within the class specified in Rule 253, there are added
conditions and requirements to be met before the exemption is
available. The Commission by this action has seemingly determined that more stringent requirements are necessary in new and
24. Revised Regulation A, Rule 253(d).
-5. Revised Regulation A, Rule 253(e).
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"untried" companies in order to better and more effectively protect
the investing public.26
LIMITED $50,000 OFFERING
The new revised regulation, like the old, permits an issuer to
offer securities in an amount not to exceed $50,000 without filing
or using an offering circular..2 7 As was mentioned above, this special

privilege for small offerings is not available if the offerings are
This
subject to the special requirements set forth in Rule 253.'
"short form" filing must contain all of the information required
to be in the offering circular except the financial statements, such
filing having its real value in that no offering circular need be
distributed to investors prior to or concurrently with a written
offer to sell the securities. In this respect the revised regulation
did not change the prior one.

However, one change is evident in that the revised regulation
sets forth specific limited matters which cannot be exceeded in
advertising offerings made pursuant to this "short form" filing.
Thus, the new regulation states that all advertisements can contain
only the name of the issuer; the title of the security, amount offered, and the per-unit offering price to the public; the identity of
the general type of business of the issuer; a brief statement as to
26. The Commission, however, on the same day it enacted this revised regulation, circulated for
public comment a notice of proposed further amendments of Regulation A. This proposal sets forth
four basic alternatives which would add further safeguards for the investing -public when asked
to purchase the securities of relatively new companies. The first proposal would in essence deny the
availability of the exemption to the securities of any issuer where such issuer has not had net
income for any one full fiscal year within the period of five years immediately preceding the date
of filing for the Regulation A exemption. The second alternative would limit the amount of securities
whidh could be offered pursuant to the exemption to 100,000 units for equity securities and 3,000
units for debt securities (bonds, debentures or other evidence of indebtedness). This second alternative would not make the distinction between companies on the basis of net income but would apply
to all companies attempting to utilize Regulation A. An apparent effect of this proposal would
be to reduce the dollar amounts receivable in companies offering low priced securities. The third
alternative is a combination of both the first and second, making the exemption available only to
issuers satisfying the net earnings test ,nd then only for offerings of the limited amounts of securities proposed in the second alternative. The fourth alternative would limit the amount of securities
which might be offered under the regulation to those issuers who could not satisfy the net earnings
requirement, while those issuers which could satisfy such requirements could offer any amount
of securities under the regulation so long as such amount did not exceed the $300,000 amount provided in Rule 254 of revised Regulation A. No conjecture will be made to ascertain whether the
Commission will enact any of these proposed amendments, but if it should, the availability of the
exemption will, of course, be predicated on compliance with these further conditions. The implication
of some of these alternatives would be to deny in toto the exemption for small "untried" companies
without net earnings. The advisability of these proposals will be left to others more able than the
writer. See, Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3664, July 23, 1956.
27. Revised Regulation A, Rule 257.
28.See supro.
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the general character and location of its property; and by whom
orders will be filled or from whom further information may be
obtained..2 1 Under the language of the old regulation if a filing was
made utilizing the $50,000 rule, any type of material could be used
in the attempt to sell the securities, so long as such material was
not fraudulent." Other than this, the new regulation did not change
the nature or character of filing under the $50,000 limited offering.
SUSPENSION OF EXEMPTION
The new regulation, like the old, sets forth specific grounds
which the Commission may utilize in temporarily suspending the
However, the revised
exemption provided by the regulation.2
regulation gives the Commission more latitude, and thus the Commission may suspend the exemption if it has reason to believe
that (1) no exemptiop is available under the regulation; (2) that
the material filed contained a false statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact necessary to be stated; (3) that
the offering is being made or would be made in violation of
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 193332- (4) that any event occurred
after the filing of the notification which would have rendered the
exemption unavailable if it occurred prior to the filing; (5) that
the issuer, any of its predecessors or any affiliated issuer was indicted for any crime involving security transactions or was enjoined from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (6) that any
director, officer, principal security holder, promoter, underwriter,
or any partner, director or officer of such underwriter was indicted
for any crime or offense involving the purchase or sale of any
security or was enjoined from engaging in or continuing any conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; (7)
that the issuer or anyone connected with the issuer failed to coop:
erate or has obstructed or refused to permit the making of any
investigation by the Commission in connection with any offering
made or proposed to be made pursuant to the Regulation A exemption. Thus, if the Commission has reason to believe that any of
the foregoing are present, it may enter an order temporarily suspending the exemption provided by the regulation. These grounds
now provide a broader base for the Commission to regulate a company filing under Regulation A and by administrative action
remove the privilege of the exemption.
The new regulation provides that upon the entry of an order
temporarily suspending the exemption, the Commission will
promptly give notice to the persons on whose behalf the filing
was made, that the order was entered, the reasons for the entry
of the order, and that upon receipt of a written request within
thirty days after entry, the Commission will within twenty days
thereafter set the matter down for hearing. If, however, no hearing is requested, the order will become permanent on the thirtieth
day after entry and shall remain effective until it is modified or
29.
30.
:1.
32.

Revised Regulation
Old Regulation A,
Old Regulation A,
15 U.S.C.A. § 77q

A, Rule 257(b).
Rule 221.
Rule 223. Revised Regulation A, Rule 261.
(anti-fraud section).
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vacated by the Commission.3 This provision modified the procedure of the old regulation after an order was entered in that
the prior regulation had no time limitation for making a request
for a hearing. Now, however, if such request is not made within
thirty days, the order becomes final until vacated by the Commission's own ruling.
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL CHANGES
An issuer filing under revised Regulation A must submit to
the Commission's Regional Office four copies of a letter of notification on Form 1-A at least ten days (exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays) prior to the date on which the initial offering is to be made. Such filing must be made with the Regional
Office for the region in which the issuers' principal business operations are conducted or proposed to be conducted. Since the new
regulation consolidates Regulation A with Regulation D, previously applicable to only Canadian companies, it further provides
that if the issuer has its principal business operations in Canada.
the filing must be made with the Regional Office nearest the place
where the issuer's principal business operations are conducted.
However, if the offering is to be made through a principal underwriter located in the United States, the filing shall be made with
the Regional Office for the region in which such underwriter has
its principal office. 34
The new regulation elaborated upon the items required to be
disclosed in Form 1-A. Thus, for example, the issuer must set forth
the name and address of his counsel, the name and address of
counsel for the underwriter, the issuer's name, date and place of
incorporation or organization, and additional exhibits, such as, all
instruments defining the rights of holders of debt securities, the
instruments defining the rights of holders of equity securities
(articles of incorporation), all underwriting contracts, a statement
to the effect that the underwriter consents to be named in the
offering circular as an underwriter, a statement that the accountant,
engineer, geologist, appraiser, or any other person whose reports
or work might appear in the offering circular has consented to
the use of such material, and other exhibits which must be appended
to the filing made under Regulation A. 35 No attempt has been made
or will be made to fully discuss and analyze all of the disclosures
required to be made by this form, but the reader's attention is
specifically directed to such form and a careful study is suggested.
The new regulation provides a more complete guide for the
issuer in specifying what matters should be discussed and disclosed
in the offering circular. Thus, the promulgation of Schedule I, appended to the regulation, codifies many of the administrative regulations and provides the issuer with a more definite guide in the
preparation of the offering circular. Again the reader's attention
is directed to this Schedule, and a careful study of the material
33. Revised Regulation A, Rule 261(b).
34. Revised Regulation A, Rule 255.
3.5 See Form 1-A appended to Revised Regulation A.
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therein included is strongly suggested before any attempt is made
in drafting the offering circular.
The new regulation, like the old, provides that all sales material prepared or authorized by the issuer for use in connection
with the offering of the securities should be filed with the Regional
Office at least five days (exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays) prior to any use of such material." The new regulation,
however, specifically requires that in addition to all written material, all script of every radio or television broadcast must be filed.
Thus the new regulation codifies what was left to implication in
the old with respect to radio or television broadcasts.
One change which perhaps should not be grouped with the
procedural changes promulgated by the new regulation since it is
really a substantive matter is the requirement that if an offering
is not completed within nine months from the date of the offering
circular, a revised offering circular shall be prepared bringing
forth all of the information required up to date.3 7 The regulation
goes still further in stating that in no event shall an offering circular be used which is false or misleading in the light of the circumstances then existing." This requirement of amending the
offering circular within a specified period of time was absent from
the old regulation and under that regulation an issuer had to be
on his guard to amend the material when substantial changes had
36. Revised Regulation A, Rule 258.
37 Revised Regulation A, Rule 256(e).
8. Ibid.
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taken effect which would make the use of his offering circular misleading. Of course, under the new regulation, if there is a material
change in the issuer's business or position, he must amend even
before the nine-month period has terminated so that his offering
circular will not be false or misleading. A failure to amend within
the nine-month period would permit the Commission to enter an
order suspending the exemption provided by the regulation on the
grounds that ". . . no exemption is available under this regulation
. . . or any of the terms or conditions of this regulation have not
been complied with . . ."' A failure to amend when there has been

material changes in the issuer's business or position would permit
the Commission to suspend the exemption on the grounds that
".. . the offering circular . . .contains any untrue statement of a

material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light4 1 of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading.

The new regulation, like the old, provides that the issuer must
submit a report to the Commission's Regional Office every six
months so that information will be available to the investing public
concerning matters such as when the offering commenced, the
number of shares offered, the number of shares sold, the total
amount received from such sales, the underwriting expenses and
commissions paid or to be paid, a detailed itemization of the use
of the funds received, the cash balance retained, and other such
information outlining the progress and success of the offering.'
However, the issuer, under the old regulation, was obligated to
submit such a report within 30 days after the end of each six-month
period following the commencement of the offering, while the revised regulation requires the filing of such a report within thirty
days after the end of each six-month period following the date of
the original offering circular or of the statement required by rule
257 (limited $50,000 offering) .42This change will make the administration of enforcing this requirement easier since now a specific
and definite date is available to ascertain when this report is due.
Under the old regulation, the Regional Office was never sure if
the offering had in fact commenced, and if it did, when it had
commenced . 4 The filing of this report is essential to complying
with the terms and conditions of Regulation A and should be 4filed
at the appropriate time with the Commission's Regional Office. 4
The new regulation, unlike the old, contains a provision to the
effect that if the issuer, any of its directors or officers, any person
.q9. Revised Regulation A, Rule 261(o) (1).
40. Revised Regulation A, Rule 261(a) (2).
41. Revised Regulation A, Rule 260. Form 2-A appended thereto.
42. Old Regulation A, Rule 224. Revised Regulation A, Rule 260.
43.Under the old regulation the Regional Office would assume that the offering commenced
either on the day following the direction to the issuer of a letter waiving the waiting provisions
imposed by the filing of the last amendment, or if no such reauest for acceleration was made to the
Commission, the ten-day waiting period was calculated and it was assumed that the offering
commenced on the day following the termination of this period.
44. Rule 261(c) (1) of revised Regulation A specifically allows the Commission to enter an
order temporarily suspending the exemption if such report is not filed as required by Rule 260.
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for whose account any of the securities are to be offered, or any
underwriter of the securities to be offered, is not a resident of the
United States, each non-resident shall file with the Commission a
written irrevocable consent and power of attorney which designates the Securities and Exchange Commission as an agent for
the purposes of accepting service of process and stipulates that
any civil suit or action may be commenced by the service of such
process upon the Commission in any action connected with or
arising out of the filing made under Regulation A. 4' After such a
filing, the Commission, any member of the investing public, or
any creditor of the issuer or the selling security holder, or any
other person could acquire adequate jurisdiction over a non-resident
where prior to such requirement those persons may have had a
right of action without an appropriate forum to bring such action.
Such a requirement further implements the Commission's desire to
protect the investing public.
CONCLUSION
What impact the foregoing changes will have upon offerings
of securities under the new Regulation A exemption has yet to be
seen. However, it seems almost certain that many of the changes
promulgated by this new regulation will provide additional material for the investing public to examine before reaching the conclusion of whether to invest or not in any" particular securities.
From this, from the special requirements placed upon certain
offerings, and from the other changes, it would appear that the
new regulation will provide additional safeguards to the investing
public when securities are offered or sold pursuant to an exemption
provided by Regulation A. This revised regulation is further evidence of the Commission's constant scrutiny of security offerings
and its effort to protect the investing public.
45. Revised Regulation A, Rule 262. The Commission has promulgated forms appended to the
regulation for the purpose of compll)ing with this rule. See Form 3-A (irrevocable appointment by
individual of agent for service of process, pleadings and other papers); Form A-A (irrevocable appointment by corporation (or other business association) of agent for service of process, pleadings
and other papers); Form 5-A (certificate of resolution authorizing irrevocable appointment by cor.
poration (or other business association) of agent for service of process, pleadings and other papers);
Form 6-A (irrevocable appointment by partnership of agent for service of process, pleadings and
other papers).

MOST RELIABLE FOR PUBLICATION OF LEGAL NOTICES
Oldest Legal Newspaper

in Colorado

The ROCKY MOUNTAIN HERALD
*

Court minutes checked daily-Expert proof reading by legal editors
(Proof submitted before publication, if desired)

*

Short notices made

*

Affidavits furnished with bill at completion of publication

P. 0. Box 1047, Denver 1

out, if desired

0

KE. 4-6072

e

1832 Curtis St.

PRACTICING
LAWYERS
and LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES

" ENJOY RESEARCH
" ARE ABLE TO WRITE SIMPLY AND CLEARLY
" DESIRE THE SECURITY AFFORDED BY AN ASSURED INCOME
" ARE INTERESTED INPLEASANT AND PERMANENT WORK WITH
UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT
APPLY NOW FOR A POSITION ON THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE

BANCROFT-WHITNEY COMPANY
Low Book Publishers Since 1856

McALLISTER & HYDE STREETS

SAN FRANCISCO 1, CALIFORNIA

(ADRESS APPLICATIONS TOEDITORIAL
DEPARTMENT)

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1956

THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE
APPLICATION OF LOCAL LAW
By

ARNOLD M.

CHUTKOW

Arnold M. Chutkow: University of Chicago, Ph. B., University
of Chicago Law School, J. D.; admitted Colorado Bar 1951;
editor, University of Chicago Law Review 1950-51; author of
numerous articles in University of Chicago Law Review and
Dicta; member Phi Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif; member
Denver, Colorado and American Bar Associations; editor of
Dicta; member of faculty of University of Denver College of
Law.
1.
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act, the effective date of which was
2 August 1946, contains, as one of the most essential provisions
thereof, the statement that the United States consents to liability
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.'
It would appear then, at the outset, that when an action is instituted under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act, that the local
law will be applied to the same extent as an action in the State
Courts between two private parties. However, in actions brought
under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act the federal courts
apparently are independently applying federal law and are not applying strictly the injunction that the United States consents to
liability as if it were a private person. The following material indicates but a few of the fields and problems presented where this
trend seems to be apparent.
II.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Federal Tort Claims Act originally provided for a one
year period of limitation from the time a claim accrued, or from
the effective date of the Act (2 August 1946), whichever was later.
This provision was amended in 1949 to provide for a two year period
of limitation. When considered with the injunction contained in the
Act that the United States consents to liability under circumstances
in which a private party would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place, the statutory provision for limitation of actions has caused the courts some difficulty.
Periods of limitation have been described by the writers as
either substantive or remedial in character. Should local periods of
limitation be described as remedial, it would seem that an action
based on the Federal Tort Claims Act would be governed by the
limitation of the Act. However, if a state statute or period of limitation is classified as substantive-affecting the right not the remedy
-it would seem that under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims
Act local law should govern at least in cases where the period of
i Tit.
28, Sec. 1346; USCA.
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limitation does not exceed that prescribed in the federal law.
This approach has not been adopted by federal courts which
have faced the problem. Shortly after the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act the question was presented in a series of cases involving local wrongful death legislation. In Burkhardt v. United
States, 165 F 2d 869, an action was brouaht for the benefit of the
widow of Burkhardt who was killed on 2 September 1945. The action
was instituted on 5 December 1946 in the United States District
Court. It was dismissed because it was not instituted within the one
year required by the Maryland Wrongful Death Act. On Appeal the
plaintiff contended that the decision of the lower court was erroneous because the action was instituted within one year after the
effective date of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Under the law of Maryland, the one year statutory period of
limitation had been described as a condition precedent to the institution of an action. The Court of Appeals reasoned that it was enjoined to look to state law for the definition of the wrong and the
extent of liability, but that it is to look to the Act itself for the limitations of time. To Judge Parker it made no difference that the
local limitation was held by the state courts to be a condition on
the exercise of the right rather than a limitation on the remedy.
"This holding is based upon the narrow ground that this limitation
is imposed by statute creating the cause of action and is, to say the
best of it, technical and legalistic reasoning, which is not followed
in all states."
The rationale of the Burkhardt case was extended in Young v.
United States, 184 F 2d 587. In this case an action was filed for a
death which occurred in the District of Columbia. The local wrongful death act provided for a one year period of limitation. The deceased suffered an injury on 25 March 1948, died on 4 April 1948,
and the action was filed on 9 May 1949, more than a year after the
death. The action, then, ordinarily would have been barred not only
under local law, but also by the period of limitation contained in
the Federal Tort Claims Act. However, on 25 April 1949, the Act
was reenacted and partially amended. Included in the amendments
was the present period of limitations:
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless action is begun thereon within two years after
such claim accrues or within one year after the date of
the enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever is
later. .

....

The government argued as it did in the Burkhardt case that
because a right of action for wrongful death was not authorized at
common law and is of statutory origin, the right does not survive
the period of limitation contained in the statute which creates it.
A majority of the Court, accepting the argument that the period of
limitation was substantive, reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims
Act extended the right which originally was created by the local
statute. Where it provides for a longer period than is granted in
the local legislation, the Federal Tort Claims Act controls as it does
where the local period is longer than that contained in the Act.
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The dissenting opinion fundamentally disagreed with the majority,
stating that since the Federal Tort Claims Act amounts to nothing
more than a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit; the two year
limitation was but a maximum time in which suits could be brought
against the government, and did not foreclose shorter local periods
of limitation which are construed to be substantive.
The majority opinion was followed and restricted in Moran v.
United States, 102 F. Supp. 275. In this case the Court refused to
apply -the Burkhardt decision and said that the Young case was
applicable in those situations where Congress had created the law
defining the substantive rights and therefore could extend the
rights so created.
In another decision, United States v. Westfall, 197 F. 2d 765,
an injury occurred in the State of Washington on 20 February 1946,
and the action was commenced 21 April 1950 (within one year after
the Federal Tort Claims Act was amended). It was contended that
since the action was created by and brought under the terms of
the Washington Statute, the local three year statute applied. It
was held, however, that inasmuch as the action was brought within
the period prescribed by the 1949 Amendment to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, it was not barred by any local period of limitation.
Accordingly, the reasoning of the Moran case was not followed
and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals applied the federal period of
limitation independently of whether or not the substance of action
was created by federal or state law.
There appears to be no doubt that where the local period of
limitation is construed to be remedial in nature, or where the local
period, regardless of its character, is longer than that contained in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter will govern.
If the Federal Tort Claims Act is assumed to be substantive
in nature, apparently the theory of the Young case, applying the
longer period of the Act and foreclosing shorter substantive provisions contained in local legislation, is logically supported. However,
if the position of the dissent in the Young case is adopted, the
United States should not be held liable since the Act amounts only
to a waiver of immunity, and the courts are enjoined to apply local
substantive law which does not conflict with the provisions of the
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enabling federal legislation; the United States does not assume
liability any greater than that of a private party under similar
circumstances. It has been said that the legislative history supports
both positions, but that practical considerations perhaps would
support the majority position. By providing a longer period in
which to commence actions, fewer private relief bills will be introduced to Congress.
The federal courts seem to be following the Burkhardt-Young
line of decisions. In the case of Foote v. Public Housing Commissioner of The United States, 107 F. Supp. 270, the court emphasized
that in an action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the time within which the suit may be commenced
should be determined by the provisions of the Act and not the
state statute of limitation.
This case presented a relatively new facet of the problem. The
Act provides that a claim must be submitted within two years from
the time it accrues. The problem facing the court in the Foote
case was a construction of the word "accrues." The plaintiffs occupied a dwelling unit in a public housing project for veterans at
Cadillac, Michigan, which project was developed by the public
housing authority and the city of Cadillac. On 14 February 1949,
a coal stove in this unit exploded, resulting in the death of plaintiffs'
two children on the following day.
On 21 July 1950, the probate court for Wexford County, Michi-
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gan, appointed the plaintiff-father administrator of the estate of
his deceased children, and on 27 July 1951, an order was entered
authorizing him to institute a suit against the government. On 17
October 1951, more than two years after the death of the children,
a complaint was filed alleging that the death was due to the negligence of the agents of the government. The defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the period
of limitation contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Plaintiff contended that under the law of Michigan a claim
or cause of action for wrongful death, which is a new cause of
action in the personal representative of the decedent, does not
accrue until the administrator is appointed. The court ruled that
the claim "accrued" upon the death of the children. It decided this
question as a matter of federal law, the state law to the contrary
notwithstanding. In support of its conclusion, it relied heavily on
the case of Reading Company v. Koons, Administrator,271 US 58, in
which the Supreme Court construed similar language contained in
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It also relied on Piascik v.
United States, 65 F. Supp. 430, which construed the language contained in the Suits in Admiralty Act.
It is submitted that these cases easily are distinguishable. The
Federal Employers' Liability Act deals with death or personal injury due to negligence of the employer or his agents. However, nowhere in this Act is there any injunction to apply the law of the
situs as is found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. In the Piascik case
the court construed language on the Suits in Admiralty Act, and itself relied on the decision in the Koons case. Because there was no
requirement to follow local law, construction of the word "accrues"
was properly decided as a matter of federal law. However, state
decisions construing such language in state legislation involves
an interpretation of local substantive law-an essential phase of
the locally created cause of action, and under the Provisions of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, such interpretations should be followed. It is submitted that the decision in Foote v. Public Housing
Commissioner of the United States goes a long way from the injunction to follow local law.
The conclusion in the Foote case was underscored in Bizer v.
United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N. D. Calif.). In this case the
defendant moved for a summary judgment on the basis that the
two year period of limitations had run in a malpractice suit brought
under the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The problem
again, as emphasized by the court, was the conflict between the
injunction to apply local law and the period of limitations contained
in the Act. Under California law, the Statute of Limitations does
not commence until the patient knows, or should know, the cause
of his disability or until the doctor-patient, or hospital-patient relationship is severed. Under local law the statute had not run because
of the definition of the accrual of the action. It was held, however,
that the question of when the period has run is a matter of Federal
law and not state law even though the latter determines the existence of the cause of action. Since under the Foote case, the action
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"accrues" at the date of the injury, the action was barred. "If
Section 2401 (b) is a real period of limitation as distinguished from
a yard stick of time, it must prescribe this beginning."
Accordingly, with regard to the period of limitations to be
applied, that which is set forth in the Act will apply even though
the state law is interpreted by local courts to be substantive,
whether shorter or longer than the period contained in the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Further, even though the local substantive law
defines and creates the cause of action, and as a part thereof the
time when it accrues, the federal courts will independently apply
"federal law" to determine the time of accrual of the action. Such
an approach is difficult to follow in the light of the injunction
contained in the Act itself and in light of the apparently erroneous
but commonly accepted notion that there is no independent body
of federal common law.
III.
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND LOCAL LAW

Title 28, Sec. 1346, USCA, provides in essence that the United
States consents to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
acts of its employees acting within the scope of their office or
employment under circumstances where a private person would
be liable to the claimant according to the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred. This principle, apparently easy to
apply, has given the federal courts some trouble in at least two
situations:
(1) The military personnel and their relationship to the
Government.
(2) Local legislation of the "Permissive Use" variety.
The first situation has provided a source of controversy because
of the fact that the soldier-government relationship is an oddity
so far as state law is concerned. There would appear to be no question that if a member of the armed forces is engaged in activity
which has a counterpart in civilian life, the question of whether
the act or omission occurred within the scope of the employment
of the soldier, could be answered by the application of local law.
However, a member of the armed forces not only is an employee
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as commonly defined, but he also assumes a 24 hour status relationship to the Federal Government, the counterpart of which is
lacking in civilian life. It is in this latter field that the federal
courts have had great difficulty in applying local law.
In the case of U. S. vs. Campbell, 172 Fed. 2d 500, a claim was
based upon evidence that while the plaintiff was standing on the
sidewalk near a railroad station, she was negligently and wrongfully collided with and knocked down by a sailor who "in line
of duty" was running to board the troop train. Obviously there
was no local law which dealt with "line of duty" and its impact on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. The concept of "line of duty"
is one which has particular reference only to governmental agencies
and their relationships to their own employees. It was held in the
Campbell case that the Government would not be liable because
of the "line of duty" concept, but only if the member of the armed
forces was acting within the scope of his employment such that
a private party would be held liable under like circumstances.
In Feres vs. U. S., 340 U. S. 135, an action was brought because
of the death of a soldier during a barracks fire due to negligence.
The Supreme Court held that the question of the relationship of
military personnel to the Government is one strictly of federal law
and that traditionally one in such a status has no claim against his
superior because of negligence.
Such a notion of the application of independent federal law
was applied in the case of the United States vs. Sharpe, 189 Fed.
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2d 239 (4th Cir.) where an action was brought to recover for injuries
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. A whole company was ordered
to move from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Elgin Field, Florida.
A few members of the company who owned private automobiles
were given permission to drive the same independently of the
convoy consisting of the remainder of the company. No specific
orders were issued to the private car owners other than the date
to report to destination. During the course of the journey, one of
the select few was involved in an accident due to his negligence
and thereafter an action was instituted against the government. It
was held:
"Attempt is made to distinguish the Eleazer case on the
ground that the collision occurred there in North Carolina
and was governed by North Carolina law. The question at
issue, however, is whether Sgt. Thompson was 'acting
within the scope of his office or employment' within the
meaning of the statute in operating his automobile; and
this involves the question of statutory construction to which
the federal courts are not bound by local decision but apply
their standards *** We look to the federal law and decisions to determine whether or not the person who inflicted
the injury was 'an employee of the government acting
within the scope of his office or employment'. We look to
local law for the purpose of determining whether the act
with which he is charged gives rise to liability. The Tort
Claims Act adopts the local law for the purpose of defining
the tort liability, and not for the purpose of determining the
relationship of the government to its employees."
This group of cases would seem to indicate that if the activity
of the Government employee is such that there is a counterpart in
civilian life, so that there are precedents to be found, the federal
courts will apply local law to determine liability. However, where
no such counterpart exists, the liability of the United States will
be decided on the basis of federal law. Such a conclusion would
appear to be consistent with the intent of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, because the Government apparently did not intend to subject
itself to liability any greater than that of a private party under
similar circumstances; if a private party could not be liable under
such circumstances, there is no reason to suppose that the United
States has consented to any other greater liability.
Another problem which has arisen under the Act is that of
whether the Government consented to liability in all situations
where a private party would be liable under local law. This is
not the same problem as whether it will be liable in situations
where a private party would not be liable, and should not be confused with the problem of being "non-civilian" activity discussed
above. This problem arises out of situations where a private party
ordinarily would be held liable under local law; the specific ques-
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tion is whether or not the United States will also be held liable in
the same fashion as a private party. The area of consideration
involves recent legislation found in a number of states which is
termed "Permissive Use" legislation.
The federal courts first faced such legislation in the State of
California. In the case of Long vs. United States, 78 Fed. Supp. 35,
an action was instituted by the plaintiff under the Federal Tort
Claims Act because of personal injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. One of the causes of action contained allegations that
a civilian employee of the army was operating a government vehicle
"with the permission and consent of the defendant". The Court
concluded under California precedent, that the employee was not
acting within the scope of his employment but was on a frolic and
detour resulting in a material deviation. However, under the California "Permissive Use Law," regardless of the scope of employment, the negligence of the employee was imputable to the
employer:
"Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible
for the death of, or injury to person or property resulting
from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in
the business of such owner, or otherwise, by any person
using or operating the same with the permission, express
or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such person
shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil
damages." (Sec. 402, California Vehicle Code)
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The court, however, refused to apply the "Permissive Use
Statute" because it held:
"Thus the lex loci delicti is in effect incorporated into the
Act, enabling the Federal Courts to refer to the common
law and statutes of the state or territory where the act or
omission occurred in order to determine (1) what act or
omission of an employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, is negligent
or wrongful."
However, where a private party will be held liable even for
acts not based upon notions of respondeat superior, local law will
not. be applied; the Government has only consented to liability
where the employee was acting within the scope of his office or
employment. Liability imposed to any greater extent than this
is beyond the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity, and accordingly the federal courts cannot and will not apply the local law.
A case arising out of Minnesota provides an interesting comparison to the Long case. In Clemens vs. United States, 88 Fed.
Supp. 971, the Court was faced with the Minnesota statute which
provides that where a vehicle is operated
"by a person other than the owner, with the consent of
the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall
*** be deemed to be the agent of the owner of such motor
vehicle ***".

The Court ruled that although the statute broadens the field
of respondeat superior, it only established the agency by prima
facie evidence which could be rebutted by the defendant. Since
the evidence was to the contrary and rebutted the presumption,
no agency was established and the United States was held not liable.
Apparently, where liability is imputed as a matter of law,
local law, as in the Long case, will not be applied. But where the
statute is only evidentiary in character, although "broadening" the
scope of respondeat superior, it will be applied by the federal courts.

Iv
CONCLUSION

Although it is commonly stated that an action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act will be governed by the law of the
situs, there are situations where local law will not be followed by
the federal courts. A few of these have been discussed above,
including such questions as the Statute of Limitations, the strictly
military activity, and local law which extends the common law
notions of respondeat superior. These exceptions to the application
of the law of the situs are growing, and it is believed that practicing lawyers who file an action against the Government f6r
negligence, should be apprised and aware of them. In any event,
it certainly is not true that under and by virtue of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the United States is now liable under the local
law where a private party would also be liable under like circumstances.

Every American is Born
With A Lawyer
At His Side
When an American citizen is born, there's a doctor
and usually a proud father on hand-besides the
mother, of course. But there's another, too. A lawyer
you can't see, but he's there just the same. You see,
among the many rights that Americans are born with
is the right to the help of a lawyer if ever accused of
a crime. For those who can't afford a lawyer, the court
must provide one.
This right is guaranteed us in the Bill of Rights
in the Constitution. It is one way our founding fathers
sought to protect Americans from the injustices that
were common in their day. Injustices symbolized by
the Bastille prison, the Tower of London.
Today in the Soviet sector of Berlin looms Lubianka prison. A sinister monument to present-day tyranny. Inside its dank confines crowd the victims of
political injustice in our time. Men who were arrested
without warrants, tried-if at all-without lawyers.
Convicted on trumped-up charges.
The right to legal counsel is only one of our
precious American rights like freedom of speech, re
ligion and the right to own property. But if one right
is denied or misused, we could lose them all. Let's
know our rights. Because if we know them, we value
them-and protect them.

Shepard's Citations
Colorado Springs
Colorado
(Reprinted with permission of The Timken Roller Bearing Company)
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THE PUBLIC, ITS STAKE IN JUDICIAL SELECTION
By

WILLIAM W. CROWDUS

William W. Crowdus: LL. B., Washington University Law School,
1922; admitted to the Missouri bar in 1922; instructor in medical jurisprudence, Washington Univ. School of Medicine since
1937; interim U. S. District Attorney, 1953; member of American Law Institute, American Judicature Society; Phi Delta Phi;
former president of The Bar Association of St. Louis; Missouri
Bar Board of Governors, 1945-47; American Bar Association
House of Delegates, 1946-48.

(From an address delivered at Law Day, University of
Colorado, April 28, 1956)
Perhaps I can best emphasize the stake of the public in judicial
selection by telling you something about conditions under the old
judicial selection system in Missouri which led its citizens to become aroused and desire a change, what they did about the situation, and how our new system has functioned in the sixteen years
since its adoption; and while I do not intend to go into the details
of the Missouri Court Plan, I will emphasize some of its features in
re,'ating how it has worked, and at the same time give you a few
of my comments about the shortcomings of the partisan elective
system generally.
At the outset, I wish to emphasize that I do not contend the
Missouri Plan is perfect, as no plan of judicial selection is perfect;
but I do maintain that our Plan is a vast improvement over our
former system. Nor do I contend that the evils under our old partisan elective method were any more pronounced under Republicans
than they were under Democrats. In addition, it is not my intention
to infer that we did not have some very excellent judges under our
former system, but these good judges reached the bench not on account of that system, but in spite of it. No doubt the same situation
is true in Colorado and in other states.
Sometimes things have to get worse before they get better.
Dissatisfaction with the Missouri political system of selecting judges
became progressively more pronounced in the 1930's and various
lawyers then began to realize the futility of presenting programs
that had only the backing of lawyers; and, thereupon, at the instigation of the Missouri Bar Association, there was formed a statewide organization consisting of both laymen and lawyers, under the
title of Missouri Institute for the Administration of Justice. The
M.I.A.J., as we have learned to call it, represented all groups and
segments of people from all parts of the state. It set out upon a
long range program for the improvement of the administration of
justice, the most important item on its agenda being to change our
mode of selecting judges.
Here are a few things which impressed upon the citizens of
Missouri the need for a change in our method of judicial selection:
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Under our old system no man aspiring to the bench could be at
all sure of his tenure in office. He gave up his practice and, even
if he made a good judge, he could not control national or state landslides, and if he happened to run for re-election on the wrong party
ticket, out he would go, irrespective of his ability or fine record;
or he would sometimes be "knifed" in the primary by his own political party, if any of his judicial pronouncements displeased the
political bosses, and then he would have to start rebuilding his law
practice, usually entailing financial loss. Hence, many of our wellqualified lawyers could not be blamed for refusing to run for a
judgeship under such conditions. Under our former method of selecting judges a candidate or judge seeking re-election, whether he
liked it or not, had to engage in a political campaign for an office
which, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, "should be absolutely independent of politics."
It is a misnomer to say that the people elect judges in our large
cities under the party elective system. In actual practice these
judges are nominated and elected by a few persons holding the
balance of political power, and many of the judges elected in our
large metropolitan districts are not chosen so much on their qualifications, but upon their ability to appeal to the greatest number of
people and often through the tricks and trading deals of the practical politician. As was stated in a report of the Special Committee
on Judicial Selection and Tenure of the A.B.A.:
"In such a contest (direct judicial primary) a shallow
fellow of good appearance, glib tongue and affable manner
has quite as good a chance of success as a John Marshall."
In other words, under the old procedure, our judicial elections,
particularly in the primary, even absent the power of the political
machines, at most amounted to a popularity contest with the people
usually knowing nothing about the judicial qualifications of the
men they were voting for as judges.
Do not misunderstand me by thinking that I am against the
political system for electing men to offices that have to do with
policy making, but under our system of jurisprudence, what on
earth do Courts have to do with policy making? A judge in the
performance of his duties is not responsible for making party poliWe Will Render Any Possible Assistance in
Connection With Your Law Book Needs.
American Jurisprudence
Texts an All Subjects
U. S. Reports, Law Ed.
American Jurisprudence
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cies nor for carrying them out. Policy making is purely a function
of the legislative and executive branches of our government. In
other words, if we want to change the social policy of our State we
ought to elect a legislature to do it, to represent our political opinion.
During the campaign for the adoption of the Missouri Court Plan,
the Kansas City Star editorialized on this point as follows:
"After all, what possible argument can be made for
keeping the courts in politics?
"No patronage is involved in a court selection. The only
way a judge can do anything for his political party is
through favors that would violate his oath as a judge. A
man who fails in his high duty as judge can only disgrace
his party.
"The strong feeling that the courts must be above
special interest is older than Magna Carta. Every man must
be equal before the bar of justice or our whole system of
justice is open to suspicion. Upon that profound sense of
justice the English-speaking people have built their conceptions of human rights. And it is worth fighting for.
"As a hangover from the free and easy days of American politics Missouri still chooses its judges in partisan
elections. This state still subjects a judge to the muck of
political campaigns. A judge is expected to rise above personal demands but he must still consider where he will
find his votes in the next election. As a result many highly
qualified lawyers refuse to seek judicial posts. Men elected
in partisan city campaigns can usually expect to hear from
the bosses, large or small, who have blocks of votes at their
disposal. Obviously more than average nerve is required."
Back in the 1930's one of our St. Louis Circuit judges interceded
for a notorious gangster with a long list of convictions and aided
in getting him paroled from a penitentiary in a nearby state. A
short time after his release this gangster was caught redhanded
when he set off a bomb in a small town near St. Louis.
Another judge signed bail bonds in blank and allowed them
to be used indiscriminately, at least where the "proper party" intervened, for getting people out on bond.
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One political lawyer, who wielded tremendous influence with
the majority of the Committeemen of the Republican Party, used to
brag to his clients that he elected the Circuit judges in St. Louis
and-from some of the things that occurred-I believe he was
truthful in his statements.
Perhaps one of the most glaring instances of judicial incompetency under our former system concerns the story of Judge Padberg who stepped literally from the pharmacy to the bench. While
employed as a pharmacist at a St. Louis hospital he was admitted to
the bar in 1927. After his admission to the bar he retained his job
at the hospital and worked there almost nine hours a day, six
days a week and did some work at nights. He had been at the hospital 10 years when he decided to run for Circuit Judge. The records
of the Circuit Clerk's office show that in the 8 years from his admission to the bar (1927) to January 1, 1935, when he took office as
a judge he was listed as being the filing attorney in only 9 suitseight for divorce and one for annulment. He became a judge,
though, despite his lack of qualifications and despite his almost
complete rejection by the Bar Association judicial poll (he received in this bar poll 42 votes compared to 527 for the Democrat
leading the ticket) simply because he was slated by the then local
political boss of his party who put him over in the Primary, and in
the ensuing election where most people voted a straight ticket on
account of national issues he was easily elected-it was a Democratic year. Judge Padberg's record on the bench was really a
travesty on justice. He threw solvent companies into receivership
without notice and, as the St. Louis Post-Dispatch commented,
"Padberg's six years on the bench have been a humiliation to the
law and to the city." He was in charge of a grand jury whose task
was to investigate flagrant election frauds. As foreman of this
jury there was an old-time politician who had a flock of relatives
on the city payroll; among its other members were three with political connections. This grand jury not only failed to return indictments, but it declined to go through the motions of investigating
the election frauds. Judge McAfee, a fellow judge, summarily discharged the grand jury, an unprecedented thing in St. Louis, and
Judge McAfee subsequently resigned explaining he no longer desired to remain a judge under the then political system. Judge Mc-
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Afee later became one of the most ardent advocates of the Missouri
Court Plan.
The conditions I have pointed out naturally do not or did not
apply to most rural districts to the same extent as they do or did in
the great metropolitan centers. As a matter of fact, our old outright
elective system as to local judges was usually satisfactory in most
rural districts where, on account of sparcity of population, most of
the voters knew the judicial candidates. Hence, the Missouri Plan
was, therefore, made mandatory as to the Judges of the Missouri
Supreme Court, and three Courts of Appeals, the Circuit and Probate Courts of the City of St. Louis and Jackson County (Kansas
City) and the Courts of Criminal Correction in St. Louis and it was
left optional as to the Circuit and Probate judges in the rest of the
state.
Here, it is quite apropos to refer to a comment of Judge Henry
T. Lummus (Chairman of the Judicial Administration Section of
the American Bar Association, 1938-1939) who said:
"A politician may make a good judge if he can stop
being a politician after going on the bench; but it is a great
handicap to good judicial work to have a system which
tends to compel every judge to be a politician in order to remain a judge."
In 1938, Judge James M. Douglas, of the Missouri Supreme
Court, who had previously been appointed by Governor Stark for
an unexpired term, was a candidate for nomination in the Democratic primary. Judge Douglas, a thoroughly qualified jurist, had
made an excellent record in office but had deeply offended the then
Boss Tom Pendergast by voting against the latter's wishes in the
famous fire insurance rate case. Pendergast, in his determination
to punish Judge Douglas, picked his own candidate, a man with
few judicial qualifications, to run against Douglas in the primary.
Then, the people witnessed the spectacle of a knock-down, dragout political fight (for an office which should be completely divorced from politics) with both candidates literally stumping each
of the 115 counties of the state, and with Judge Douglas devoting
months of his time away from his judicial duties, at a great loss to
the taxpayers. The cost of Judge Douglas' successful fight was esti-
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mated at various figures between $10,000 and $25,000. Is there any
wonder, therefore, that our people became disgusted with our partisan system of selecting judges and that many eminently wellqualified lawyers would not, and could not afford to, seek judicial
office under such conditions.
The late Fred L. Williams, an eminent jurist, in a speech supporting the Missouri Court Plan, related that he was elected to a
short term to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1916 because Woodrow
Wilson kept us out of war, but was defeated for re-election to the
bench in 1920 because Wilson did not keep us out of war.
Well, naturally our people became aroused and when they
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became aroused they became united. The Missouri Legislature refused to submit for a vote of the people a Constitutional Amendment embodying the Missouri Court Plan. Our citizens then went
to work in earnest under the leadership of the M.I.A.J. and really
put democracy to work by getting the proposal on the ballot at the
1940 election through the initiative section of our State Constitution
by obtaining approximately 100,000 signatures on petitions from all
sections of the state. Here, I want to emphasize that no selfish interests were behind the Court Plan-it was adopted through the
work of all factions and classes of men and women-labor, business, teachers and other professional groups, etc.,-in almost the
same manner as a community as a whole supports a Community
Chest or Red Cross drive.
Of course, there was some opposition to the Missouri Plan.
There is, no doubt, opposition to the Colorado proposal. It is always
difficult to bring people, particularly lawyers, into complete agreement on any subject. As was once said, "If you wait for everyone to
approve an idea, you will wait forever."
This is a world of compromises and such is true of the Missouri
or any other system of judicial selection. One writer described the
Missouri Plan as really a compromise between the outright appointive system and the old popular elective system, adding that it retains the best features of both.
Perhaps I am getting on dangerous ground when I try to single
out any one group as deserving the most credit for the successful
campaign for the Missouri Court Plan, but, in my opinion, the untiring work of thousands of women of the State of Missouri was the
biggest factor of all.
You will probably be amazed to learn that less than sixty days
after the Amendment was proclaimed to be in effect, and before the
Court Plan had even been tested, the Missouri Legislature, which
had previously refused to submit the Plan for a vote of the people,
passed by one vote a resolution calling for the resubmission of the
question at the 1942 election. It was apparent, therefore, that the
selfish politicians did not like the Plan. To me, this action proved
our contention that the Plan would go a long way in taking our
courts out of politics. So we had a second campaign and this time
the opposition really came out in the open. Because of this fact, in
some ways the second campaign was easier than the first. Our
citizenry became so aroused in 1942 that the Plan was retained by
almost twice the margin of votes it received at its enactment in
1940.
To clinch the fact that the citizens of Missouri like our Plan
they retained it by an overwhelming vote, in our new Constitution
in 1945, despite the efforts of the "Court House Ring" to take it out
of the Constitution. So, the people of Missouri on three occasions,
in a five-year period, approved the Plan.
The first indirect test of the Plan came a great deal sooner than
most people anticipated. In 1940, at the same election at which the
Court Plan was adopted, Forrest C. Donnell, a Republican, was,
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on the face of official returns, elected Governor of Missouri by a
majority of around 3,000 votes. His Democratic opponent contested
the election, and the Legislature (which was predominated by
Democrats), in apparent violation of the Missouri Constitution, refused first to seat Governor Donnell and then conduct the contest.
Thereupon, the attorneys for Donnell filed in the Missouri Supreme
Court a mandamus suit against the Speaker of the House of Representatives, seeking to compel him to publish the election returns
seating Donnell. It so happened that all of the seven members of
the Supreme Court had previously been elected as Democrats long
prior to the adoption of the Missouri Plan. Nevertheless, the decision of the Court was unanimous in issuing the writ of mandamus
in favor of Donnell, the Republican, against McDaniel, the Democrat. Under the old popular elective system, all of these seven
members of the Court, if they sought re-election, would have
first had to face the vicissitudes of a primary election and, if successful therein, then be the Democratic candidates at the ensuing
general election. Under the provisions of the Court Plan, however,
these judges would not have to face a primary election; and would
not run as Democrats, but would, in a general election, run solely
on their respective records, with no opponents, on a separate judicial
ballot without party or political label, the sole issue being whether
they should or should not be retained in office. Hence, when the
aforesaid honest and courageous decision was rendered, these seven
judges did not have to worry about party politics; at least none of
them had to make any apologies to any political leaders or committeemen.
I state, without fear of contradiction, that thus far, in every
instance but one or two, only lawyers and laymen of the highest
type have been selected for the various nominating commissions,
and both the public and the bar have been completely satisfied with
the personnel thereof, save these several instances. The nominating
commissions are the "lifeline of the Plan." If you do not have good
nominating commissions you are not apt to get good judges. While
on the subject of the nominating commissions, I also want to state,
without fear of contradiction, that in every instance, with one, or
possibly two, exceptions, where the appropriate nominating commission has submitted three nominees to the Governor and appoint-
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ment has followed, those nominees have all been amply qualified
lawyers of the caliber which would reflect credit on the judiciary.
Hence, under our experience to date, in ninety-eight percent of the
appointments, no Governor could have made a bad appointment had
he been inclined to do so.
As I want to be absolutely fair in telling you how our Plan has
worked, I will point out an occurrence which some people have
seized upon as a criticism of our new system. Our legislature in
August, 1953 created three new circuit judgeships for Jackson
County; and the Governor until February, 1956, refrained from
making the appointments from the nominees submitted to him and
requested the nominating commission to submit other names, but
the commission refused to do so on the ground that it was not compelled to under the Constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court
ruled on July 23, 1954 that a nominating commission is not required
to reconsider or withdraw any nominations even if a Governor so
requests, but that a commission may voluntarily revise panel nominations, for cause, before the Governor has acted thereon. In any
event, to end the stalemate in the Jackson County situation, the
Sixteenth Circuit Nominating Commission in 1956 submitted to the
Governor slightly reshuffled versions of its three original panels
and Governor Donnelly, a Democrat, then appointed two Republicans and one Democrat to the three new divisions of the Jackson
County Circuit Court.
Judge Nick T. Cave, Chairman of the Nominating Commission
which was involved in the aforesaid dispute with the Governor, had
this to say about the matter in a letter he wrote in 1954, viz:
"It seems unfortunate that this one controversy, in
fourteen years, between a commission and the governor,
should be pointed out as proof positive that the Missouri
Plan is a failure. One dispute does not justify the destruction of a plan which has worked so well in all other vacancies. This is evidenced by the fact that since the present
controversy arose, three vacancies have been filled by the
governor on the appellate courts, and two on the circuit
courts. Three of those vacancies were filled by the appoint-
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ment of a Republican, although our governor is a Democrat."
The nominative and appointive features of the Plan have been
invoked on thirty-eight occasions. With the possible exception of
two appointees (whose selections were criticized by some solely because of lack of experience, and not on any other grounds) both the
Bar and the public have highly commended these judicial appointments, all the appointees, excepting the two just mentioned, being
unquestionably well qualified for the judiciary; and one of these
appointees has since developed into a .very fine judge, while the
other, who was appointed a little over a month ago, has not had
sufficient time to have his qualifications thoroughly tested.
Some of the critics of the Plan have complained, however, that
the Governors, wherever possible, have followed party lines in making the appointments. While this has been true in the majority of
instances, on one occasion a Democratic Governor had no opportunity to follow party lines as all three nominees were Republicans.
In any event, this criticism has pretty well faded out, because our
present Governor, a Democrat, in his last 13 appointments has selected 6 Republicans, whereas he could have in all 13 cases picked
a Democrat.
Moreover, as I have said, in every instance save, perhaps one
or possibly two, all of the nominees have been lawyers of outstanding character and ability and every judge appointed thus far, excepting maybe the one appointed a little over a month ago (who has
not had an opportunity to have his qualifications fully tested), has
met our objective, which is to place high type, conscientious, able
and eminently qualified lawyers on the bench. In this connection it
is also important to note that under our Plan it makes no difference
what a man's politics are before he goes on the bench-the point
is that once he has attained the bench he is independent of politics:
he is under no obligation to his party committeeman or the politicians because they did not put him there in the first instance and
he is not dependent upon them, nor is it necessary for him to incur
political obligations in order to remain in office. If a judge has a
good record he is assured of a long tenure in office but if his record
is bad a simple and direct method is provided for removing him.
Thus, more better qualified men have been and will be attracted to a judicial career and the public is unquestionably benefited by this system.
There have been seven tests of the elective feature of the Plan,
all of which have proved that the party affiliations of judicial candidates have made no difference to the voters, since these elections
have sometimes gone Republican and at other times Democratic, yet
all judges, but one, under the Plan, have been retained in office despite their varying political affiliations. The vast majority. of these
retained judges had bar endorsement; and the one removed by the
voters had an extremely bad record-he was already in office when
the Plan became effective and under the terms thereof was allowed
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to seek retention in office, at the expiration of his term, in the same
manner as a judge appointed under the Plan.
Some lawyers have complained that the Plan freezes the incumbents in office and that it is difficult or virtually impossible
to defeat a judge running for retention in office. It cannot be
denied that every advantage is with the incumbent seeking retention in office. However, unless the incumbent has fallen down on
the job or proven himself unfit he should be retained in office under
the spirit of the Plan. As I told you, one judge has been defeated
for retention in office, which refutes the aforesaid criticism. Dean
Roscoe Pound once said, "Too much talk has been given to the
matter of getting less qualified judges off the bench. The real
remedy is not to put them on." I mentioned this because of the fact
that a long range view must be taken about a proposal like the
one we are discussing. To illustrate this point further, when the
Plan was adopted in Missouri there were 46 incumbent judges then
subject thereto (now 51 judges are under the Plan) and with the
38 appointments to date, approximately 80% of said incumbents
have been replaced. To date, no judge appointed under the Plan has
been rejected or repudiated in any election or in any Bar Association poll.
Unquestionably, the prohibition in the Plan against a judge engaging in politics has had a tendency towards the making of a
more independent judiciary and non-political courts and has enabled our judges to devote their entire attention to the business of
their courts. The action of Honorable Leslie A. Welch, a Republican, when he was appointed Judge of the Probate Court of Jackson County (Kansas City) in 1942, is a practical demonstration of
the wisdom of this provision. In the Probate office at that time
ther were twenty-one employees, seventeen of whom owed their
appointments to the Democratic machine; six had been Pendergast
or Shannon precinct captains. Judge Welch read the constitutional
provision to these employees and told them that the Probate Court
should be completely divorced from party politics; that no person
would be discharged or employed by his Court because he or she
was a Democrat or a Republican, but that no one could retain his
position if he or she held office or was an active worker in any
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political organization or party. On unsigned slips, all of the employees supported Judge Welch's view and agreed to cease their
political activities.
Our judges themselves like the Plan. They no longer need fear
the dangers of the primary, as the primary is abolished under the
Plan; political pressure has been taken off their backs; they are
prohibited from engaging in politics and from making contributions
to political groups, and the only cost to a judge seeking retention in
office is a three cent stamp to cover the sending of a notice to the
Secretary of State announcing that he desires to be a candidate for
retention in office. Under our old system, the cost of being elected
a Circuit Judge in St. Louis in the 1930's ran as high as $5,000, while
the salary at that time was only $8,000 per annum; the salary has
since been raised to $14,000.
Now a judge can devote his entire attention to the business
of his Court and does not have to fear the so-called political lawyer.
I regret to state that in many instances such was not the case under
the old partisan system. In addition, our judges have unquestionably asserted greater independence since the Plan became effective.
This is manifested by the fact that formerly our judges, in appointing receivers, etc., usually followed party lines, making their selections from lists furnished them by their party committeemen. Now
it is not at all unusual for a lawyer or layman of opposite political
faith to that of the judge to receive such an appointment. Under
our former system, in many cases, lawyers would be selected by
litigants for their supposed, if not real, influence with a certain
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judge, whereas there is no longer any necessity for litigants selecting attorneys with such a thought in mind.
We now have a truly independent judiciary in Missouri and
our litigants are actually receiving a higher quality of justice. and
the confidence of the people has been restored in our Courts. Our
Plan has encouraged men to serve on the bench who would not
submit themselves to the ordeal of campaigning for office under
the old political system or who lacked the means to finance such
a campaign; and we now have more highly qualified men on the
bench than we had under the old system, and this includes most
of the incumbent judges at the time of the Plan's adoption, inasmuch as they no longer have to be politicians in order to remain on
the bench. Further, the administration of justice has been speeded
up in Missouri. From all angles the public, which always has the
biggest stake in the courts, has been substantially benefited by our
new system.
I have talked so much about what I think of the Missouri Plan
that perhaps you would like to know what some people outside of
the State of Missouri think of it. I have a brief-case full of laudatory comments about the Missouri Plan from eminent jurists, lawyers, laymen, newspapers and writers throughout the United States
and, of course, I cannot begin to give you all of them. With your
leave, I will mention only a few.
Mr. James Kerney, Jr., Editor of the Trenton, New Jersey,
Times, in a speech in New York on September 19, 1951, before the
section on Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, stated in part, as follows:
"* * * Barring a sizeable staff, it is virtually impossible to
make a complete survey of press reaction to court administration and procedure, and judicial appointments and conduct. Working within these limitations, I have had the
cooperation of 86 newspaper editors, representing a crosssection of American journalism. They have culled from
their output over the past year such editorial comments,
pro and con, as seemed to them worth noting.
"*

* * By far the largest measure of praise has been for

the Missouri Plan, which is in essence the American Bar
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Association's recommended objective for judicial appointments. There is continuing active support for the adoption
of the Missouri Plan in Pennsylvania, Texas, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas and Ohio. In fact, among the 86 newspapers
surveyed, only one held to the emotional appeal -that it was
unbelievable 'the right to vote has become so degraded
that the people no longer can be trusted to choose their
own judges'. For the most part advocacy of the Missouri
Plan has been coupled with editorial comment urging
higher pay and better retirement systems for the courts."
Since organized labor has a tremendous stake in any plan of
judicial selection, it is very appropriate that I quote from the
comment by Frederick W. Mansfield, an eminent lawyer who has
represented labor in many cases before the Supreme Judicial Court
of the State of Massachusetts. Massachusetts, as you know, has
never changed its system of selecting judges by appointment by
the Governor with the approval of the Governor's Council, an
elected body. Mr. Mansfield stated in part:
"* * * 'As one who has had some experience in the trial
of so-called labor cases, I hope I may be pardoned if I
venture to say a personal word of commendation and approval of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In
this practically new and unexplored field our Supreme
Court has probably penetrated further than any other
civilized tribunal. In many cases it has laid down rules
of law that have been and will be invaluable to organized
labor. It has been most painstaking and careful, eminently fair, and absolutely fearless. It has lived up to the
highest, noblest and best traditions of Massachusetts, and
no greater praise can be accorded to it.
"'And surely the poorest and the humblest member of
society needs just such a Court-needs a fearless judiciary. He needs able, honest, and strong judges far more
than his more wealthy and more fortunate neighbor. The
wealthy litigant can surround himself with eminent and
high-priced counsel-the poor litigant must often be content with inferior counsel, or with none, in which case he
must depend entirely upon the judge. The judiciary is the
best defensive bulwark of the weak against the encroachments of the strong, the powerful and the selfish.'"
Bear in mind that under the Missouri Plan the people have
the final say-so as to whether an appointee shall be confirmed or
rejected.
Perhaps one of the best articles ever written, which illustrates the stake of the public in judicial selection, was one by
Vera Connolly, published in the January, 1950 issue of NATION'S
BUSINESS entitled "Weak Judges Weaken Your Rights". The
title to this article itself goes on to point out that the courts of
the Nation are supposed to be symbols of justice for all adding,
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"that they may not be is largely our own fault". The Connolly
article quotes an interview with Judge Harold R. Medina at some
length, a few excerpts therefrom being:
"* * * 'Are there many lawyers with a big practice and a large

income who would be willing, as you were, to give it all up
for a district judgeship?' the writer asked. (Judge Medina
gave up a $100,000 a year practice for his $15,000 judicial post.)
"'Yes,' he said emphatically. 'There's not a man at the
bar, however distinguished his position, who would not
gladly accept an appointment to the bench-provided he
could do so without being under any obligation. That's the
important point-no obligation. Any lawyer would do it,
no matter if he'd been earning $400,000 a year, if he didn't
have to knuckle to anyone.
"It's a great honor to sit on the bench,' he added thoughtfully. 'And more men are willing to serve the public decently than you realize. But no man wants to compromise
with his principles. * * *'

"'What is the remedy?' Judge Medina was asked.
"'Get an aroused public to demand some system of appointing judges that isn't political, that's based on merit
only. Missouri-and many other states are studying the
Missouri plan-has done just this-in connection with her
state court system. Something similar must be worked out
for our federal courts.'" (Emphasis supplied)
The average citizen has a very vital stake in judicial selection.
His rights, his liberties, his safety, and even his life may depend
on the impartial administrationof justice by the courts.
What has been accomplished in Missouri can be attained in
Colorado, if your citizens are awakened to the need for adopting
the excellent proposal for a new system of judicial selection in your
State and are willing to work therefor.
Missourians have no patent or monopoly on enterprise and perseverance. But, I warn you, your campaign will not succeed through
wishful thinking alone. You have a big job ahead which can be accomplished only through prodigious and organized efforts as a whole.
Votes do not count, unless they are in the ballot box on election day.
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"YOU, DOCTOR, WILL BE A WITNESS"
By C. JOSEPH STETLER
Director, Law Dept., American Medical Association
(The following is based upon an address given by Mr.
Stetler at the Midwinter Clinical Session of the Colorado
State Medical Society at Denver on February 16, 1956. The
address is presented here for its value in pointing out some
of the considerationswhich both counsel and witness should
bear in mind in planning medical testimony.-Editor.)
In my work with the medical profession I have come to the
realization that practically all doctors have an aversion to appearing in court and testifying in a lawsuit. Although a few have had
unpleasant experiences as witnesses, most have been frightened
by the exaggerated reports by a colleague of "murderous crossexamination" by an opposing counsel. For those of you who feel
put upon by your role in litigation it may be some consolation to
know that the Greek root or derivation of the word "witness" is
"martyr."
There are, however, some basic reasons behind this aversion
which deserve serious consideration. First there is a fundamental
difference in the method of approach of law and medicine so far
as the discovery of truth is concerned. The lawyer attempts to
maintain his position by argument and contention with opposing
counsel. His life is one of advocacy of causes; his object is to magnify his own arguments and to belittle those of his opponent. The
physician, on the other hand, does not live by contention. His
training is in the free and open atmosphere of the laboratory, hospital, sickroom or private office. He demands full and frank discussion and disclosure of all phases of a case. All factors pertaining
to the case are brought to light and evaluated. When all pertinent
data are collected, he correlates them and forms a judgment with
reference to the illness. By training and practice, therefore, the
whole tempo and attitude of the day-to-day experience of the physician and lawyer are totally different.
In addition to being unfamiliar with situations which to a
lawyer are commonplace, physicians sometimes complain that they
are practically made parties to the case in which they testify. It
is often made to appear that the witnesses for the plaintiff are
testifying against the defendant. This should not be true, of course.
The witnesses should be impressed with the fact that they are
testifying concerning a certain set of facts and should studiously
avoid any appearance of advocacy.
Another reason for a doctor's hesitancy to act as a witness
is his failure to understand the concept of examination and crossexamination. The general opinion of the average medical witness,
when he takes the witness stand, and has taken an oath to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and has
finished testifying, seems to be that while one attorney is trying

Nov.-Dec., 1956

DICTA

to bring out the truth, the one on the opposite side is trying equally
hard to keep the truth from being brought before the jury and court.
The physician dislikes the time that court cases take from his
daily activities-and it is not because he fears he might lose a
fee. Physicians today are very busy people with morning, afternoon
and sometimes all night hours. The effect of stories about doctors
cooling their heels in court for hours on end while lawyers argue
seemingly obscure legal technicalities is very difficult to overcome.
I believe it is unfortunate but true that the average physician's
attitude toward a court appearance is summed up in a recent
article by a man who is a doctor and lawyer, Sidney Shindel of
Connecticut, published in the American Medical Association Journal. He said in part that:
"To the physician, the courtroom means wasting valuable time to give a carefully restricted opinion, necessarily
based on inadequate observation, for persons who cannot
understand the details of the problems and who probably
will not believe him anyway."
To the physician who thinks this way the "typical" trial lawyer
is visualized as an oracle with a silver tongue, who delights in
mortifying witnesses and who has a mysterious glamour that winds
judges and juries around his finger. Fortunately this Perry Mason
type of character exists almost exclusively in fiction and the movies.
Physicians are amazed to find that most lawyers are quite human,
with very normal reactions, such as respect for a brother profession
and are apt to regard physicians as their partners in a joint venture
-the administration of Justice.
Let me state then at this point that this is not all a one-sided
picture. The lawyers also have their problems with the doctors.
I wonder how many lawyers at some time or other have not had
trouble in getting a medical report from an examining physician.
Very few, if any, I'll wager. Have you ever lost a case which to
you seemed to cry for justice, but which could not be won because
of the lack of proper medical testimony? Have you ever had a
medical witness that played "hard to get" or one who wanted an
exorbitant fee? "Sure you have."
I believe that if physicians generally understood the importance
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of the medical report they would not refuse it or delay in supplying
it. A doctor should be impressed with the fact that the medical
report is the complete basis for the preparation and trial of the
medical phases of the case. While perhaps no one knows with
exactness, it has been estimated that from 50 to 60 per cent of all
litigation involves personal injury. Most of these cases involve
serious questions of fact concerning the alleged injuries of the
plaintiff or claimant. In these cases the medical report is an absolute
necessity.
In this same regard, physicians who have a dread of testifying
in court, and that covers the majority, should be made to realize
that a complete and factual medical report will keep them out of
court in 9 out of 10 legal cases. Unfortunately, some doctors do
not know what should be included in a proper medical report. First
identify the patient. Tell who gave the first aid, if any, and what
it consisted of. The doctor should also reveal what his first and
all subsequent examinations showed, the tests he performed, x-rays
taken, the results thereof, consultations, with whom and the number, and the treatment prescribed. His prognosis, his opinion as to
the final outcome and his opinion as to the causal connection, if
any, between the accident or occurrence and the condition he now
finds are also essential. The doctor should also show his estimated
bill.
Since we all know that the things we fear most are the unknowns, I would like to suggest that the legal profession become
more active in familiarizing the doctor with courtroom procedure
and the do's and don'ts which should govern a medical witness.
Maybe we could start out with some specific suggestions:
(1) Do not be afraid. There is no real magic about testifying.
Just remember that a courtroom is a place where practical
men are engaged in the serious work of endeavoring to
administer justice. The honest physician who comes to
court to tell the truth has nothing to fear.
(2) Don't testify unless you are satisfied that you are qualified
in the area of medical care involved.
(3) Don't neglect to inform your patient's attorney of all
unfavorable as well as favorable facts.
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(4) Be courteous. This, of course, applies to all parties to the
proceedings including the lawyers.
(5) Don't be smug. A jury is quite likely to react adversely
to an attitude of this type. If you are an outstanding character or eminently well qualified, this fact will be apparent
to the jury, probably through the efforts of your attorney..
A modest attitude on the part of the witness is much more
impressive.
(6) Tell he truth without reservation or exaggeration. This
means too that a question should not be answered categorically in all instances. Often the proper answer shoufd
begin with an "if".
(7) Don't regard it is an admission of ignorance to indicate
that your opinion is not conclusive. To do otherwise is
frequently dishonest. Besides, candor and frankness wins
respect and confidence.
(8) Don't use terminology which will not be understood by
the jury, legal counsel or the judge. The role of the witness
is to explain, not confuse.
(9) Don't lose your dignity. Remember that an attorney does
not cease to be a gentleman because he questions you on
cross-examination concerning your training, your experience, your integrity, your intelligence or even your par-
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entage. If his questions are irrelevant trust the court and
jury to attach little significance to them. To lose your
temper and attempt to show him up will detract from
your effectiveness.
We all know that neither law nor medical science is static.
Both grow daily and as they grow, each supplements the other.
Despite our recent amazing progress, we of both professions have
much to do. The fact that we realize and appreciate that each can
assist the other is perhaps the first necessary step. The medical
profession comes to us with its knowledge and information. We
of the law bring to medicine our problems and hopes.
If you will permit me to do so I would like to close my remarks
on a lighter vein. You will recall that earlier I referred to the
necessity for the use of simple language by the medical witness.
The failure of a witness to do this in an actual case aroused the
poetic instincts of one writer, who in verse commented upon the
testimony of the physician as follows:
"With an erudite profundity,
And subtle cogitabundity,
The medical expert testifies in Court:
Explains with ponderosity
And keen profound verbosity
The intricate nature of the plaintiff's tort.
"Discoursing on pathology,
Anatomy, biology,
Opines the patient's orbit suffered thus:
Contusions of integuments
With ecchymose embellishments,
And bloody extravasation forming pus.
"A state of tumerosity
Producing lacrimosity,
Abrasion of the cuticle severe,
All diagnosed externally,
Although he feared, internally
Sclerotic inflammation might appear.
"The jury sits confused, amazed,
By all this pleonasm dazed,
Unable to conceive a single word,
All awed, they think with bated breaths
The plaintiff died a thousand deathsWhat agony, what pain he had endured.
"Said then the counsel for defense,
Devoid of garrolous eloquence,
Would I be correctly quoting you
To say his eye was black and blue?
To this the doctor meekly answered 'Yes'."
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FEDERAL LOYALTY PROGRAM & PROCEDURE:
ACCUSED EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE
ADVERSE WITNESSES; NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE; NECESSITY OF WITNESSES TAKING OATH
By EVERETT

ELLSWORTH SMITH

Everett E. Smith: admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1933;
practised law in Minneapolis, Washington, D.C., and Kansas
City; former appellate counsel in Denver for the Internal Revenue Service; former Assistant Judge Advocate of the Third
Army in Europe; private practice in Denver since 1954.
The case of Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 75 S. Ct. 790 (1955),
is perhaps more notable for the issues left undecided than those
passed upon. Dr. John J. Peters, an eminent professor of medicine,
had been for some years a special consultant in the United States
Public Health Service Compensation was at a specified rate per
diem for days actually worked, i. e., from four to ten days per year
when called upon by the Surgeon General. After the appropriate
agency board several times had considered the question of Dr.
Peters' loyalty to the Government of the United States and decided
the question favorably to the employee, the Loyalty Review Board
in April, 1953 decided upon its own motion to look into the matter
de novo.
At the hearing held by a panel of the Review Board in May,
1953, the only testimony offered was that in favor of the federal
employee. According to the opinion of the Supreme Court, however,
the record before the Review Board also "contained information
supplied by informants whose identity was not disclosed to petitioner," the employee. "The identity of one or more, but not all,
of these informants was known to the Board. The information given
by such informants had not been given under oath." On the record
before it, the Review Board found a reasonable doubt of Dr. Peters'
loyalty and purported to bar him from federal employment for three
years.
In the employee's suit for a declaratory judgment holding that
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his removal and debarment from employment was invalid, the
District Court for the District of Columbia granted the respondent's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, in reliance on Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (App. D. C., 1950), affirmed by an equally divided
vote, 341 U. S. 918, 71 S. Ct. 669 (1951).
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment given below in the
instant case. The Court decided that the petitioner was entitled to a
declaratory judgment that his removal and debarment were invalid.
The invalidity, according to a majority of the Court, lay in the
Review Board's acting on its own motion without a referral of the
case to it by either the employee or the agency board. The Presidential Order providing for the Loyalty Review Board conferred no
authority upon the Review Board to proceed upon its own motion as
it had done. Three of the justices of the Court dissented from this
ground of the Court's holding.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black questioned whether
the Presidential Order establishing the loyalty program was authorized. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring only in the Court's decision to
reverse the judgment below, said (at pages 350-351):
Dr. Peters was condemned by faceless informers, some
of whom were not known even to the Board that condemned him. Some of these informers were not even under
oath. None of them had to submit to cross-examination.
None had to face Dr. Peters. So far as we or the Board
know, they may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus
Oates, who revel in being informers. They may bear old
grudges. Under cross-examination their stories might disappear like bubbles. Their whispered confidences might
turn out to be yarns conceived by twisted minds or by
people who, though sincere, have poor faculties of observation and memory.
Mr. Justice Douglas went on to add that in his opinion the decision of the Review Board deprived Dr. Peters of the liberty or
right to work, in violation of the "due process" clause, and perhaps
under the circumstances amounted to an unconstitutional equivalent of a bill of attainder.
Language similar to that of Mr. Justice Douglas was used in
the majority opinion in Parkerv. Lester, 227 F. 2d 708 (CA-9, 1955),
which case decided that merchant seamen are entitled to "due
process;" were not given it by the security-screening regulations applicable to them; and that the enforcement of the regulations should
be enjoined. In that case, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to
decide and did not purport to decide whether a government employee is entitled to "due process" before (a) he is branded as disloyal and (b) dismissed from employment. Assuming that the general right to work involved in Parker v. Lester does not include the
specific liberty to work for the government, does the "due process"
clause of the Fifth Amendment protect against the arbitrary and unreasonable imposition of the badge of infamy, the finding of disloyalty?
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Although the Supreme Court had granted certiorari "because
the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left
unresolved" by the Bailey case, supra, the majority of the Court explicitly declined, in view of the alternative ground of decision available, to consider a constitutional issue. As matters stand, therefore,
the constitutionality of a board's deciding an issue of employee
loyalty according to the procedures followed by the Review Board
in the Peters case remains to be cleared up. To express it differently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia twice has
held the Constitution gives no protection, but the Supreme Court
has not spoken.
If the handiwork of the Founding Fathers does not save their
descendants from the type of procedure described in the abovequoted language of Mr. Justice Douglas, there nevertheless appears
to be nothing in the Constitution to forbid its present-day beneficiaries from devising procedures which provide the rudiments of
a fair hearing to federal employees. To speak of the legality only,
the eighteenth-century doctrine of "due process" embodied in the
Fifth Amendment may be supplemented by a twentieth-century
legislative or executive prescription of "fair process" involving an
employee's right to confront and cross-examine any informants
willing to be sworn and testify against him under such circumstances.
As for the judiciary, it is at least doubtful whether it should
develop a doctrine of "fair process" if the coordinate branches of
government fail to make such a prescription. In any event, on the
basis of existing legal doctrines, there appears to be no authority for
court relief against administrative judgments of disloyalty and dismissal which provide scant notice, have no support in evidence and
permit no confrontation or which (about the same thing) are
"based" on undisclosed or vaguely disclosed charges of faceless informers unless (a) there happens to be an irregularity in the administrative proceedings as in the Peters case or (b) the "due process" clause or other constitutional protection is available in the
circumstances.
Beyond the ken of the courts and the scope of this note are
certain questions of policy rather than law, such as: Is the fair
treatment of public employees, whether in sensitive or non-sensitive
positions, as consistent with the public safety and security as the
determination of "loyalty" by methods such as employed by the
Review Board in the Peters case? If not, can fair treatment of the
individual employee (itself a public demand) be made reasonably
consistent with such other, supposedly conflicting, public demands
as safety and security?
Orders for Dicta Index, for back issues of Dicta, and new subscriptions should be
addressed to:
Business Manager, Dicta
University of Denver College of Law
Civic Center Campus
Denver, Colorado
Please make all checks and money orders payable to COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION.

*ONROY

DXE3-oo74
VALUATION STUDIES of
INDUSTRIAL-

COMMERCIAL-RESIDENTIAL

PROPERTIES

ECONOMIC SURVEYS lot S/HOPPING CENTERS
COST ESTIMATES 0 QUANTITY SURVEYS 0 USE ANALYSES

REAL ESTATE VALUATION CONSULTANTS
C. J.CONROY

SENIOR MEMBER SOCIETY OF RESIDENTIAL APPRAISERS
MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS

815 CHERRY

DICTA

Nov.-Dec., 1956

COMMENT ON EDITORS
With the publication of the present issue of Dicta, the personnel
of the Student Board. of Editors and Staff of Dicta changes. The Editorial Board believes that great strides have been made during the
past year to improve Dicta both in format and editorial content.
A great share of the credit which is due for these advancements
must be given to the following members of the retiring Board. of
Editors:
Managing Editor
-WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY
Article Editor-SPIRO NICKOLAS
Student Work Editor..................- RICHARD EASON
Business Manager
--JAMES F. CULVER
Associate Editors_ -JAMES HORTON & JOHN J. CONWAY
Staff: John Deisch, Melvin Coffee, Richard Zarlengo,
Richard Bangert, John Bush, Robert Pierce.
To these extremely capable and talented individuals go the
thanks of the Editorial Board and to the following individuals, constituting the new Student Board of Editors and Staff, go congratulations and hopes for an even better publication:
M anaging Editor---------------------------------------------ROBERT PIERCE
Article Editor................
--.............................- .. JOHN DEISCH

Student Work Editor--------------------RICHARD ZARLENGO
Business Manager----------------------------------MELVIN COFFEE
Associate Editors
James Horton, John J. Conway,
Richard Bangert, John Bush, Bill Kenworthy,
Richard Eason, James Culver, Spiro Nickolas
Editorial Board:
Editor, University of Denver College of Law
ARNOLD M. CHUTKOW
Denver Bar Association
JOHN FLEMING KELLY
Colorado Bar Association
ROBERT DAVISON
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Colorado State Board of Examiners of Architects v. Rico': Equity
Will Not Enjoin the Enforcement of an Unconstitutional Statute

By

JoHN CORBRIDGE

John Corbridge: B. S. (Business), University of Colorado, 1950;
LL. B. cum laude, University of Denver, 1956; admitted as a
certified public accountant in Colorado, 1954; admitted to the
Colorado bar, 1956; former President of the College of Law
Board of Governors; member of Order of St. Ives; Phi Delta
Phi and Omicron Delta Kappa.
The plaintiff in this case sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction prohibiting the Board from acting to interfere with his
practice of architecture. As a basis for such relief, the plaintiff alleged that the licensing statute was unconstitutional. The judgment
of the trial court granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiff was
reversed by the Supreme Court. Justice Moore's opinion held that
it was improper to grant injunctive relief against the enforcement
of an unconstitutional statute.
This doctrine was first announced as the Colorado law in the
case of Denver v. Beede.2 The basis of the rule, then as now, is that
equity will grant relief only where there is no plain, speedy and
adquate relief at law. That doctrine is undisputed. The problem
lies in its application and the definition of what will constitute a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
The jurisdiction of equity would appear to be a matter of state
law, even where it is alleged that a statute violates the Constitution
of the United States. Still the instant case is squarely in conflict with
the rule as announced in Truax v. Raich 3 by the Supreme Court of
t
Cola.----... .
; 289 P. 2nd 162 (1955). See also:
Olympic A. C. v. Speer, 29 Colo. 158.
Canon City v. Maning, 43 Colo. 144, 95 P. 537 (1908).
Brunstein v. City of Fort Collins, 53 Colo. 254, P. 119 (1912).
Farmers' Dairy League, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 112 Colo. 399, 149 P. 2nd 370
(1944).
Walker v. Begole, 99 Colo. 471, 63 P. 2nd, 1224 (1937).
Denver v. Thrailkill, 112 Colo. 488, 244 P. 2nd 1074 (1952).
2 25 Colo. 172, 54 P. 624 (1898).
239 U. S. 33 (1915); see also Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Co., 305 U. S. 176 (1938).
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the United States. This case was an action to enjoin the threatened
enforcement of a state statute prohibiting the employment of more
than a stated number of aliens. The plaintiff was an alien employee
whose job was at stake. The reasoning of that opinion is applicable
to the Colorado decision. Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
"It is also settled that while a court of equity, generally
speaking, has no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors a distinction obtains, and equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain
criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional enactments,
when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the
safeguarding of rights of property. The right to earn a livelihood and to continue in employment unmolested by efforts to enforce void enactments should be similarly entitled to protection in the absence of an adequate remedy at
law."
It may be contended that the Truax case should be distinguished
since it was the employer rather than the plaintiff-worker who was
subject to prosecution on violation of the unconstitutional statute.
The later United States Supreme Court decision in Terrace v.
Thompson4 settles any such contention. The Court specifically held
in the Terrace case that defending a criminal prosecution is not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
Any discussion of this problem would be incomplete without
mention, of the leading case of Ex Parte Young.5 That decision enjoined the enforcement of a railroad rate violation of which would
subject one to a penalty of a fine up to a maximum of $5,000.00.
The Court held that when the penalties for disobedience of a
statute of this nature are so severe as to intimidate one from resorting to the courts to test its validity, the statute in itself constitutes a deprivation of equal protection of the laws. This doctrine
binds state courts since it rests upon the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U. S. Constitution.
As a practical matter, the penalties imposed by the architectual
act which was in force at the time of the Rico decision 6 were sufficiently large to preclude a test of the statute by criminal prosecution. Penalties were set at fines up to $200.00 per day.
That a defense of criminal prosecution is not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy at law is established by the Terrace case, at
least for the federal courts. Under Chief Justice Holmes' decision
in the Truax case, the right to pursue one's livelihood is a property
right and equity should enjoin enforcement of a statute which unconstitutionally restricts such property right, even though the
statute provides criminal punishment for violations. Further, this
type of statute may well be a deprivation of equal protection under
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
4 263 U. S. 107 (1923).
5 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
6 1953 C. R. S. 10-1-15.
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Attorneys: Privilege of Taking Bar Examination Can Be Taken
Away If Applicant Can't Satisfy Board of Bar Examiners of His
Moral Qualities.
By

BERNARD

H.

THORN

Bernard H. Thorn is a senior at the University of Denver College
of Law. He received the B.S. in Law from the University of
Denver in 1955. A member of Phi Delta Phi, he has also served
on the College of Law Board of Governors.

The case of Rudolph Schware vs. Board of Bar Examiners of
the State of New Mexico, which was recently decided in our neighboring jurisdiction, is one that seems bound to provide much
controversy.' The petitioner applied to take the bar examination
in February, 1954; his petition was denied and a rehearing was
granted in July of the same year. At the conclusion of the second
hearing it was agreed that the first opinion should stand.
The facts are very clearly stated in the opinion. It appeared
that the applicant used several Italian aliases, which in light of
the fact that he was a Jew seeking employment in a predominantly
Italian industry does not shock one's conscience. The petitioner
was planning to organize the Italian employees in the plant in
which he had secured work into a labor organization, which in
time he did. He also used an alias on a similar occasion in California
when working at a shipyard there; when he was arrested along with
two or three thousand others during a labor dispute he gave the
police another alias for fear of losing his job.
In 1940 the applicant was arrested in Detroit, Michigan, for
violating the Neutrality Act of 1918. He was recruiting troops to
fight for the loyalists in the Spanish Civil War. This charge was
nol-prossed. The applicant was arrested once again in Texas when
he was driving a friend's car from Michigan to California. There
were no charges filed against him and he continued on his way.
One must be mindful of the fact that he has never been convicted
of any crime.
An important point the Court treated with due concern was
the applicant's former membership in the Communist Party. He
belonged to the Young Communist League in his senior year of
high school. In 1934 he joined the Communist Party and remained
a member until 1937. He dropped out of the party for a short time,
then returned, remaining until 1940. He quit the party, disillusioned
with its aims and leadership.
The Court was apparently aware of the different connotation
the Communist Party had in the 1930's when the applicant was a
member, which, indeed, is far from the view we hold of the party
today.
The Court noted a simple statement which the applicant enclosed in a letter to his new bride while on board a boat to the
Pacific Theater of operation during the second World War:
1 I. Schware vs. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P. 2d 607.
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"Jim Crow is on a par with anti-semitism, anti-Catholicism,
and anti-Communism. In a democracy one cannot discriminate against a minority."
In the same letter the applicant wrote that all "antis" are:
most dangerous and stupid mistakes for Americans to
make. They violate Christian ethics as well as all other
ethical principles that recognize the brotherhood of man.
To top it all off consider them immoral."
The Court, I presume, thought this language indicative of a
failure to really repudiate the party or its ideology. This is a very
logical conclusion taken without the knowledge that the petitioner
was recently married and may have been trying to impress his
bride with his philosophical attributes.
When applying to take the Bar examination the applicant
was unable to give all of his addresses since he was sixteen, which
were required on his application. It is doubtful if many people
could remember all of their addresses over a twenty-four year
period if they had moved as much as the applicant.
When in 1950 the petitioner enrolled in the law school of the
University of New Mexico he discussed with the Dean his former
affiliation with the Communist Party. The Dean and the petitioner
both felt that his activities wouldn't be a great obstacle in his path
since they had occurred many years previously.
The Court was aware of the petitioner's good repute among
his fellow students. While going to law school he started an anonymous scholarship for needy law students. He received letters from
teachers, fellow students and business associates attesting his good
moral character when he sought admission to the bar. In affirming
the Board of Bar Examiners' conclusion, the Court stated:
"We take no pleasure in the duty we have had to perform
for no man is all good or all bad. The record on which this
decision is based came from the petitioner himself who
presently enjoys good repute among his teachers, his fellow
students and associates and in his Synagogue. But our obligation to the Bar of this state knows no compromise. Petitioner has sought an office difficult to obtain and difficult
to serve."
The cases are numerous, too, which hold that by asking admission into the legal profession an applicant places his good moral
character directly in issue and bears the burden of proof as to
that issue.The case of Re Wells, supra, brought out the fact that the
conditions and burdens of proof are not the same for a disbarment
procedure as they are for the admission to the bar.
2 Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 p. 697, 72 ALR 923 (1930); In Re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163
p. 657 (1917); In re Weinstein, 150 Ore. 1, 42 Pac. 2d. 744.
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The law seems to be well settled on the requirements for
admission to the bar and we find the Court saying in a North
Carolina case, 3
"'This upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive license
to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must,
in addition to other requisites, satisfy the Court, includes
all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It
is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
a good name which the applicant has acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily
would, should or does. Such character expresses itself, not
in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong..."
The Court said the applicant had not convinced them that he
was a man of good moral character such as that required for the
holding of the office of attorney in the State of New Mexico. While
some might, no doubt, feel that the applicant was denied due process
by this decision, it has been established by a long list of cases that
the right to practice law is4 not a constitutional one. We find the
Court saying In Re Greer,
"The right to practice law is not a natural nor constitutional
one in the sense that the right to engage in the ordinary
avocations of life, such as farming, the industrial trades and
the mercantile business. It has always been considered a
privilege only, bestowed upon certain persons primarily for
the benefit of society."
In a recent Florida case the Court said in dictum that while
membership in the Communist Party was enough in itself to sustain
a disbarment it was still incumbent upon the State to prove membership, and the mere invoking of the Fifth Amendment was not
in itself evidence of membership.-,
If membership in the party is in itself grounds for disbarment,
then in the requirement for admission, where the slightest blur on
one's character is sufficient to keep him from admission, merely
previous membership might suffice to deny admission.
There is. no doubt that loyalty to the Constitution is an inalienable condition to a lawyer's service as an officer of the Court.
Communist Party membership is incompatible with this loyalty.'
It would seem in this case that even though one has led an
impeccable existence for a number of years, it is still incumbent
upon an applicant for the position of attorney in society to show
an almost flawless character from the age of responsibility.
3 In

re Farmer, 191 N. C. 235, 131 S. E. 661.
In Re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P. 2d 96; Re Lavin, 59 Idaho 191, 81 Pac. 2d 727.
S.E..
.
r Sheiner vs. State, 24 L.W. 1041,
e In Re Anastopo, 3 III. 2d. 471, 121 N.E. 2d. 826.
4
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OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
JURORS-FEES-SALARIES

REQUESTED BY:

55-2803-April 14, 1955
William L. Gobin, Judge of the District Court
16th Judicial District

FACTS:

The clerks of courts in the 16th Judicial District are in doubt as to the application of House
Bill 36, passed by the 1955 General Assembly,
approved by the Governor, and now in force,
which provides in part as follows: Jurors shall
receive, for attending any court of record,
court commissioners or referee, the following
fees, to wit: six dollars per day while actually
engaged on the jury; three dollars per day for
attendance on panel alone.

QUESTION:

When shall the "jurors" receive $6.00 per day
and when shall they receive $3.00 per day?

CONCLUSION:

The "jurors" shall receive $6.00 per day only
during the time between which they are sworn
to try a case and the time when they are
discharged from service in that case. At all
other times while in attendance on panel they
shall receive $3.00 per day.

SOIL CONSERVATION

REQUESTED BY:

55-2805-May 3, 1955
Kenneth W. Chalmers, Secretary
Colorado State Soil Conservation Board

QUESTION:

Can the board of supervisors of a soil conservation district by their official action exclude
from the district those lands which have become devoted exclusively to (a) commercial
uses, (b) industrial uses, and (c) domestic
dwellings?

CONCLUSION:

The board of supervisors of a soil conservation
district, by official action on petition by landowners or of their own volition, may exclude
lands devoted exclusively to commercial and
industrial uses, subject, however, to the provision in 128-1-5 (5), '53 CRS, that no land
shall be so excluded from a district unless and
until all lawful taxes and other charge of the
district against such lands shall have been paid.
Lands devoted to residential use may not be so
excluded.
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COLORADO

REQUESTED BY:
FACTS:

A &M

COLLEGE

55-2771--January 20, 1955
Joseph M. Whalley, Business Manager
Colorado A & M College
During the operation of the School of Veterinary Medicine at Colorado A & M College, Fort
Collins, Colorado, the clinic accepts animals for
treatment from private citizens. During the
course of treatment occasionally an animal will
die, whereupon the animal's owner will seek
damages from the college for the loss of the
animal. Students and college officials participate in the course of treatment.

QUESTION:

Is the college liable in damages for the death
of an animal which died while undergoing
treatment at the college?

CONCLUSION:

The college would not be liable for damages
for the death of an animal while under treatment at the veterinary college.
LIQUORS

REQUESTED BY:
FACTS:

55-2775-February 3, 1955
George J. Baker, Secretary of State
Mr. A has applied for a transfer of hotel and
restaurant liquor license from No. 1215 Twentieth Street to No. 2800 Downing Street, both
within the City and County of Denver. The
institution known as Juvenile Hall is located
at 2844 Downing Street. The Denver Public
Schools maintain two regularly qualified teachers at Juvenile Hall. Regular classes are held
there.

QUESTION:

Is the institution within the City and County
of Denver known as Juvenile Hall a public
school within the prohibition contained in 752-12 (9) Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, which
provides that no license shall be issued to or
held by any person who will operate any place
where liquor is sold or to be sold by the drink
within five hundred feet from any public or
parochial school, college, university, or seminary?

CONCLUSION:

The institution within the City and County of
Denver known as Juvenile Hall is not a "public
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school" within the meaning of 75-2-12 (9) Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, and is not one of
the other educational institutions therein
named.
DEPT. OF HIGHWAYS

55-2780-February 16, 1955
REQUESTED BY: Mark U. Watrous, Chief Engineer
Department of Highways
The Department of Highways proposes to adopt
FACTS:
certain changes in the Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices, most significant
changes being the change-over from black-onyellow stop signs to white-on-red stop signs,
and the adoption of a new sign called "YIELD
RIGHT OF WAY."
1.
Does the present State law permit the
QUESTIONS:
change-over from black-on-yellow signs to the
white-on-red stop signs?
2. While replacing the old signs, would a dual
operating standard be required pending completion of the conversion?
3. Would special legislation be required to
give the "YIELD RIGHT OF WAY" sign lawful authority and meaning?
4. What procedure should be observed for effecting appropriate revision of the Manual
beyond consideration and approval of the State
Highway Commission?
1. The Department of Highways may change
CONCLUSIONS:
the signs from black-on-yellow to white-on-red
under the present Colorado law.
2. There should be a dual operating standard
set out in the Manual during the conversion.
3. Special legislation would be required to
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give the "YIELD RIGHT OF WAY" sign enforcible authority and meaning.
4. The procedure to be observed and effecting
the revision of the Manual is within the discretion of the State Highway Commission.
However, this Manual should correlate so far
as possible with the current system approved
by the American Association of State Highway
Officials.
TAXATION-COUNTY AsSESSOR

REQUESTED BY:

55-2788-March 10, 1955
J. R. Seaman, Chairman
Colorado Tax Commission

FACTS:

Following the regular sessions provided for by
the Constitution and by statute of the County
and the State Boards of Equalization, and without reference to orders issued by such bodies,
the Assessor of Weld County increased the
assessment on all irrigated lands within his
jurisdiction by 25%. Several owners of such
lands filed petitions asking for an abatement of
taxes so increased.

QUESTION:

May the Board of County Commissioners acting
as a County Board of Equalization and the Tax
Commission legally take action on the petitions
so filed?
A taxpayer may not be denied administrative
remedies to correct assessments where such
assessments are made after cessation of the
regular sessions of the County and State Boards
of Equalization. Such administrative remedies
are for the benefit of the taxpayer who cannot without fault on his part be deprived of a
right to be heard.

CONCLUSION:

Best Wishes to the Bar Association

NEWTON OPTICAL COMPANY
GUILD OPTICIANS
V. C. Norwood, Manager
309 - 16TH STREET

DENVER
Phone KEystone 4-0806

Oculists - Prescriptions Accurately Filled
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FLASH - A RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN G. I. LOAN
FORECLOSURE PRACTICE
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT
The Subcommittee on District Court Forms of the Forms Standardization Committee of the Colorado Bar Association published in
31 Dicta, page 379, October 1954, a Checklist for Foreclosure Proceedings Involving Loans Insured Or Guaranteed By The Federal
Housing Administration or the Veterans Administration. That
article assumed that the regular statutory Public Trustee foreclosure
could be conducted.
All too often, unfortunately, the title to the premises being foreclosed is encumbered by a Federal tax lien, usually an income tax
lien. Under these circumstances, a Public Trustee foreclosure is not
sufficient because it does not confer proper jurisdiction over the
United States to establish priority of the deed of trust over the tax
lien. Lawyers have in the past found it necessary to bring a court
foreclosure and to obtain jurisdiction over the United States by
complying with 28 U.S.C. Section 2410. As we all know, a court foreclosure is more difficult and more time consuming and lawyers generally would much prefer to foreclose through the Public Trustee.
Interestingly enough, the Veterans Administration has now
established a system by which, if title is acquired by them, they can
negotiate with the other branch of the Government holding the tax
lien and obtain a release.
We are informed that the Veterans Administration will in many
cases approve, I might almost say would prefer, a Public Trustee
foreclosure even though a Federal tax lien is of record. The most
important step to take is to contact the Loan Guaranty Division
of the Veterans Administration before you begin foreclosure of a
loan which is insured or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration
if you know that a Federal tax lien is recorded against the property
as a junior encumbrance. There are excellent chances that the Veterans Administration will approve a Public Trustee foreclosure instead of a court foreclosure under these circumstances.
We are all conscious of the fact that the attorneys fees allowed
by the Veterans Administration are much less than those prescribed
by the Minimum Fee Schedule adopted by the Denver Bar Association. The ability to conduct a public trustee foreclosure should minimize the loss which attorneys suffer from such foreclosures.
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